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Abstract 
 Over the last century and half, US industry has seen the emergence of several 
different management models, but we still understand little about the factors that drove 
their evolution. We propose a theory of this evolution based on three nested and 
interacting processes. First, we identify several successive waves of technological 
revolution, each of which prompted a corresponding wave of change in the dominant 
organizational paradigm. Second, nested within these waves, each of these organizational 
paradigms emerged through two successive cyclesȄa primary cycle which generated a 
new management model that obsoleted the prior organizational paradigm, and a secondary 
cycle which generated another model that mitigated the dysfunctions of the primary cycleǯ 
model. Third, nested within each of these cycles, we identify a problem-solving process in 
which the development of each model passed through four main phases during which 
various related management concepts competed for dominance.  
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The Evolution of Management Models: A Neo-Schumpeterian 
Theory 
 
 Even in the more advanced industrial economies, it was less than two centuries ago 
that the internal organization of business enterprises, until then essentially ǲprimordialǳ 
and traditionalistic, became the object of deliberate organization design efforts (Pollard, 
1965; Coleman, 1993). These design efforts have often been informed by management 
modelsȄa term we use to refer to the distinct bodies of ideas that offer organizational 
managers precepts for how best to fulfill their technical and social tasks. The present paper 
proposes an explanation of the evolution of such models.  
The main models are well known. In broad outline, the sequence of their emergence 
has been: Industrial Betterment, Scientific Management, Human Relations, Strategy-and-
Structure, and Quality Management. We extend the history backward in time one further 
step, to include the Line-and-Staff model developed in the early railway industry, and we 
extend it to two more recent modelsȄto what we call the ǲBusiness Processǳ model and 
the Knowledge Management model.  
While there are growing bodies of research on the rise and fall of specific models 
and on the generic dynamics of innovation, fads, and fashions in management models, 
efforts to explain the longer-term evolution of these models in the history of American 
management are far sparser. The main contributionsȄBarley and Kunda (1992), 
Abrahamson (1997), Kunda and Ailon-Souday (2005)Ȅhave been impressive in their 
scope and creativity; but they leave us with a frustratingly thin account of this historical 
development.  
The limitations of this prior research can be stated succinctly. Barley and Kunda in 
their various works (Barley and Kunda, 1992; Kunda and Ailon-Souday, 2005) argued that 
this sequence can be understand as a pendulum swinging between cultural antinomies of ǲrationalǳ and ǲnormativeǳ approaches reflecting long Kondratiev waves of economic 
growth. While we find much with which to agree in their account, we will argue that it gives 
us no way to explain how or why one rational model differs from other rational models, nor 
how or why the various normative models differ from each other. Abrahamson (1997) 
enriched Barley and Kundaǯs account by showing the effects of labor movement activity 
and labor turnover rates on the post-emergence persistence of these models; he also 
discussed different factors that have an impact on the timing of the pendulum swings; but 
he offered no further insight into the modelsǯ contents.  
We argue that to understand the changing contents of these models beyond their 
classification as rational versus normative, we need to bring into the foreground the role of 
technological innovation, rather than leaving this factor in the background as this prior 
scholarship had done. To do this, we build on recent work in the neo-Schumpeterian 
tradition of technology studies (as developed by the authors discussed below) and on ā©ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ and advance a new theory of the evolution of management 
models. Our theory differentiates three nested processes and show how these processes 
interact to generate the observed evolution of the models and their contents.  
First, we identify four main waves of change in models, and we suggest that these 
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are driven by corresponding waves of Schumpeterian technological revolution. We argue 
that the emergence of a technological revolution in leading industries generates radically 
new organizational and management problems. The solution to these problems takes the 
form of a new organizational paradigmȄa new understanding of the nature of enterprise 
organization, calling out the distinctive characteristics of the organizational context within 
which managers perform their duties.  
Second, nested within these waves, we distinguish two main cycles of management 
innovation, which create in succession two new management models: together these two 
model form the new organizational paradigm. Initially, a primary cycle, sparked by a 
technological revolution, yields a management model that represents a revolutionary break 
with the prevailing organizational paradigm. The unanticipated dysfunctions of that initial, 
paradigm-revolutionizing model provoke a secondary cycle, which yields a model that aims 
to overcome the dysfunctions of the paradigm-revolutionizing model and thus stabilize the 
new paradigm.  
And third, within each of these cycles, the development of each model passes 
through four phases akin to the phases characterizing the development of a new 
technology and akin too to the phases of development of a new cultural or social 
movement. These are: (a) the identification of a widespread organizational and 
management problem, (b) the creation of innovative managerial concepts that offer various 
solutions to this problem, (c) the emergence and theorization1 of a new model from among 
these concepts, and (d) the dissemination and diffusion of this model. These phases are 
nonlinear and overlapping. 
This theory allows us to overcome the key problem of prior scholarship on the 
evolution of models and lays a foundation for future research in this area. By linking the 
emergence of new models to specific underlying technological revolutions more rigorously 
than did prior scholarship, we can explain major changes in the modelsǯ contents. 
Moreover, by integrating a dialectical account of the cyclical process with a stronger 
account of the longer-term waves of paradigm change, we can see how apparently 
competing modelsȄsuch as Scientific Management versus Human Relations, or Strategy-
and-Structure versus Quality ManagementȄare better understood as complementary pairs 
within a common organizational paradigm. And by unpacking the phases of development of 
each model, we can identify the different roles played by different actors and management 
concepts in driving change ǯǡand we can discern the agency behind 
these structural changes.  
With a more robust theory of this longer-term evolutionary development, we are 
better able to understand the causal dynamics of specific historical episodes, and we 
enhance our capacity to interpret the organizational changes that are currently underway. 
The present paper therefore aims to contribute, if only in a modest way, to a fuller answer 
to one of the big questions of our fieldȄǳǫǳȄa question that ǲǳȋ
ǡ
                                                        
1  ȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?Ȍǣǲǡ -conscious development and 
specification of abstract categories and the formulation of patterned relationships such as chains Ǥǳǲǳ the sense of Winter and Szulanski 
(2001). 
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2005: 35).  
We focus on the USA, because this country was increasingly central in the world 
economy over the past two centuries and because it served as the main locus of innovation 
in management models for most of the period. We hope that future research will address 
the experience in other countries, synthesizing some of the ideas we present here with the 
internationally oriented research of 
ƴ (1994) and others.  
In the following sections, we first summarize briefly the prior research on 
management models. We then explain the neo-Schumpeterian foundation of our theory. 
Building on that foundation, we sketch in narrative form the evolution of management 
models over the past century and a half. We then re-read this history more theoretically to 
explicate the three key processes driving this evolution. A discussion section explores the 
how our account can be applied to make sense of both some recent management concepts 
and the longer-term trend in management models. The conclusion summarizes and 
suggests some directions for future research. 
PRIOR RESEARCH ON MANAGEMENT MODELS  
Distinguishing models, paradigms, concepts 
 The concept of a management model has not received much scholarly attention. 
Prior terminological choices seem to be loose. Management models were referred to as 
both ǲrhetoricsǳ and ǲideologiesǳ by Barley and Kunda (1992) and Abrahamson (1997). 
Guillén (1994) called them equivalently ǲmodelsǳ and ǲparadigms.ǳ We define a 
management model as a distinct body of ideas that offers organizational managers precepts 
for how best to fulfill their technical and social tasks. We have in mind what Kramer (1975: 
47) described as ǲsystematically organized knowledge applicable in a relatively wide 
variety of circumstancesǳ and ǲa system of assumptions, accepted principles and rules of 
procedure.ǳ  
 We propose that these models can be considered as the organizational analogues of 
what the neo-Schumperians scholars of technology call "generic all-pervasive technologies" 
(Perez, 1994), or ǲgeneral purpose tǳ (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995). If, 
following Griffith (1999: 474), ǲǡǡȀ
techniques for instrumental action,ǳthen general-purpose technologies can be defined as 
higher-order families of technologies (such as those pertaining to water power, steam 
power, electricity, computers) from which lower-order, more specific technological 
applications derive.  
We can thus distinguish the idea of management model from the lower-order 
construct management concept. Within a given management model, there are often 
multiple management concepts, sometimes competing for preeminence, sometimes 
complementary, but sharing common themes (see Davenport, Prusak, and Wilson, 2003 for 
a partial list of such concepts). We propose two criteria for differentiating management 
models from these lower-order management concepts: (a) generalityȄmanagement 
models, like general purpose technologies, open up entire new fields of application, relative 
to the lower-order, more specific implementation concepts; and (b) pervasivenessȄ
management models are applicable in a wider range of industries. Abrahamson and 
Eisenman (2008) for example, have shown that concepts such as Job Enrichment, Quality 
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Circles, and Total Quality Management all share some common themes, and that these 
themes are quite different from those associated with Management by Objective (a concept 
more common in the prior period) and those related to Business Process Reengineering 
(which emerged later).  
We also propose to differentiate management model and management concept from 
a higher-order constructȄthe organizational paradigm. This term has been used in 
passing by several articles (Djelic and Ainamo, 1999; Höllerer et al., 2014), and receives 
more in-ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
scientific paradigm, we define an organizational paradigm as a set of ideas that characterize 
the essential features of the enterprise as an organization. While management models ǯkey tasks, organizational paradigms aim at a more abstract level, 
articulating an understanding of the organizational context within which managers work.  
From specific models to their historical evolution 
 There is broad agreement on the identity of the main management models, and 
there is a considerable literature focused on individual models as they emerged in the USA. 
We list here just a few of the key sources. These and other studies are also convincing in 
showing that the models under discussion were not only discursive constructs in the 
management literature, but had wide-ranging impact on management practice. 
Railroads and their Line-and-Staff management model were discussed by Chandler 
(1965, 1977), and Industrial Betterment by Brandes (1976), Jacoby (1985) and Nelson 
(1975a). Taylorǯs (1911) Scientific Management, the dominant model during the first half 
of the 20th century, has been the object of many studies (e.g., Aitken, 1960; Nelson, 1980; 
Kreis, 1992; Nelson, 1992; Kanigel, 2005; Wren, 2005; Nyland, Bruce, and Burns, 2014). 
Several studies (e.g., Gillespie, 1991; Wren, 2005; Bruce and Nyland, 2011; Hassard, 2012) 
analyzed the relationship between the Human Relations model (Roethlisberger and 
Dickson, 1939) and Scientific Management. General Motors and its multidivisional form 
inspired the preeminent model of US companies in the second half of the 20th centuryȄ
Strategy-and-Structure: it has been analyzed by several famous texts (Drucker, 1946; 
Chandler, 1962; Sloan, 1964). 
ƴ (1994: Ch. 2) traced the evolution from Scientific 
Management, to Human Relations, and Strategy-and-Structure. Several studies have 
analyzed the relationship between this last model and the subsequent emergence of quality 
and culture concepts in US industry (e.g., Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow, 1989; Womack, 
Jones, and Roos, 1990; Cole 1999). Several authors have argued that we now live in an age 
in which internal and external networks are interconnected by IT-supported work and 
information flows (e.g., Nohria and Eccles, 1992; Castells, 1996): Business Process 
Reengineering inaugurated what we call the Business Process model that captured some of 
the potential of these new technologies (Hammer, 1990; Hammer and Champy, 1993). 
More recently, the focus has shifted to Knowledge Management as a possible alternative 
model (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Prusak, 1997; Davenport and Prusak, 
1998; Scarbrough and Swan, 2001; Davenport, Prusak, and Wilson, 2003).  
 Prior scholarship has not only explored specific models but also made important 
progress in understanding the evolution of these models. As noted above, for Barley and 
Kunda (1992), the main factor explaining the content of successive models is the pendulum 
swing between rational and normative cultural antinomies. Rational models are associated 
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with and supported by surges of rational rhetoricsȄsurges whose subsequent life-cycle 
resemble the evolution of social movements (e.g., Blumer, 1969; Macionis, 2012)Ȅbefore 
being challenged by a normative rhetoric and a surge of normative rhetoric. 
Barley and Kunda (1992) argue that the alternation of rational and normative 
models is driven by long, Kondratiev waves of economic growth, which, at least according 
to some accounts, are in turn driven by waves of technological revolution (Schumpeter, 
1939). Abrahamson (1997: 501-502) elaborates: ǲIn order to innovate and cause long wave 
upswings, organizations depend on engineers and scientists, and consequently, such 
individuals ascend to positions of authority in these organizations (Fligstein, 1990). 
Engineers and scientists need management techniques to fit employees to new 
technological innovations, and they are receptive to the machine and system metaphors 
used in rational rhetorics to describe and justify the use of techniques that could serve this 
purpose.ǳ Surges of normative rhetoric, by contrast, occur because ǲ
capital begin to decline, managers should show greater interest in rhetorics that focus on ǡǯǳ (Barley and Kunda, 1992: 
391). 
This account, rich as it is, leaves us without any explanation for the differences 
between the ideas expressed in one rational rhetoric and another, or between one 
normative rhetoric and another. Each model is classified as either rational or normative; 
but we are left with no way to differentiate any further ǯ. This is the 
gap that prompts the question at the heart of the present paper.  
Labor process theory grounds a second strand of scholarship on the history of 
management models; but it offers only a little more texture ǯ
contents. The underlying assumption in this scholarship is that, insofar as the employment 
contract is an incomplete one, the interests of workers and executives are starkly opposed 
in determining the actual delivery of labor services; and the conflict over work intensity is 
therefore the main determinant of work organization (Braverman, 1976). Under 
competitive and profitability pressure, managers develop and adopt new technologies; they 
respond to workersǯ struggles over work intensity by developing ever-more refined 
systems of labor control; and these systems diffuse where workers lack the capacity to 
resist.  
Where Braverman posited a simple contrast between the direct entrepreneurial 
control that predominated in the 19th century and the family of Scientific Management 
techniques that proliferated in the 20th century, later work in this stream of scholarship 
suggested greater complexity. Edwards (1979) saw a shift from direct control to a variable 
combination of technical control via the assembly line and bureaucratic control based on 
internal labor markets (the latter emerging in conjunction with the Human Relations 
model). Barker (1993) interpreted the Quality Management model as a new control system 
he calls concertive. Burawoy (1985) saw the main sequence going from market despotism 
(Edwardsǯ direct control), to hegemonic control (Edwardsǯ bureaucratic control), and most 
recently to a neo-liberal system of ǲhegemonic despotism.ǳ  
As noted by Barley and Kunda (1992), for the main part this labor process tradition 
sees the evolution of management models as following a sequence that can be described in 
terms of Etzioniǯs (1961) typology of control, going from coercive to utilitarian to 
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normative forms of control. Others have sought to nuance this rather linear view. Littler 
(1982) highlighted the importance in the 19th century of internal contracting as an 
alternative to direct control. Friedman (1977) argued that a strategy of ǲresponsible 
autonomyǳ was an enduring alternative to direct managerial control and Scientific 
Management. Jacoby (1985) made a similar argument with respect to the ǲwelfaristǳ 
tradition of non-union employment relations. From this literature, we take on board the 
idea that struggle over work intensity influences forms of work organization and models of 
management; but these studies on labor control offer little further insight into the 
evolution over time in the content of the successive models. 
A NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN FOUNDATION 
 We argue that technology is a powerful factor shaping the evolution of these 
management ǯǤOur argument builds on and extends ǯ
research (Chandler 1962, 1965, 1977, 1990). Chandler showed how radical technological 
innovation (most notably, the steam-powered railways) provided the impetus for 
organizational and management innovation (e.g., Daniel McCollumǯ
Line-and-Staff model), and described how this organizational and management innovation, 
in turn, stimulated the growth of the innovators' firms (e.g., the Erie Railroad). These 
exemplary firms, in turn, contributed to the growth and shaping of new leading industries, 
and such industries contributed to transforming the entire economy and society of the US 
(Chandler, 1977). Chandler, however, did not develop an explicit theory of these causal 
connections (as noted inter alia by Nelson and Teece, 2010): such a theory is our goal here. 
 In pursuing this goal, we propose to bring forward to center-stage Schumpeterǯ 
(1934) analysis of technological revolutionsǤǯ analysis has been invoked 
sometimes by the scholarship we reviewed in the previous section, but always only as a 
background factor. In bringing his analysis forward, we shift the focus from long 
Kondratiev cycles of economic growth to one of these cyclesǯ main antecedents. In this 
move, we are following the path traced by a more recent neo-Schumpeterian generation, 
most notably Freeman (Freeman, 1994; Freeman and Soete, 1997; Freeman and Louçã, 
2001; Freeman, 2008) and Perez (2002, 2007, 2010) (see also Murmann (2003, 2013), 
Nelson and Winter (1982) and Winter and Szulanski (2001)).2  
                                                        
2  It is worth quoting Perez (2010: 190) at greater length on this shift in focusǣǲ
that this concept of great ǯǯ
notion of long waves (Kondratiev, 1935; Schumpeter, 1939). For them, the focus is on the 
upswings and downswings in economic growth. Although Schumpeter clearly ascribes such 
waves to technological revolutions while Kondratiev does not commit himself to any particular 
causal factor, they are both trying to explain long-term variations in gross domestic product 
(GDP) and other economic aggregates. What this author proposed (Perez, 2002: 60-67, 2007: 
783Ȃ786) was to focus instead on explaining the process of diffusion of each technological 
revolution and on its transformative effects on all aspects of the economy and society, including 
among them the impact on rhythms of economic growth. This re-orientation has resulted in a 
different dating of the surges (as opposed to those of the traditional long waves) and in 
identifying a different set of regularities in the patterns of diffusion, which are the object of the Ǥǳ	overview of evolutionary economics that situates Perez 
alongside Schumpeter as well as other long-wave theorists, work on systems of innovation, 
Management models p.  
 
9 
We make this conceptual move aware that it involves several tradeoffs: they are all 
aspects of the choice we have made in favor of generality over simplicity and even more so 
over accuracy (using the classic trilemma articulated by Thorngate, 1976; see also Weick, 
1999). First, when we shift the focus from macro-economic conditions to their 
technological antecedents, we substitute for a relatively simple, quantitative construct 
(such as GDP growth rate) one that is far more complex, multidimensional, and difficult to 
measure. Second, while this move promises greater insight into some aspects of the 
evolution of management models, it will inevitably downplay the role of the contingencies 
of history such as wars or legislation. Third, we do not attempt to take the next step further 
back in the causal chain, where the interplay of science, technology, politics, and culture 
would explain the content and timing of technological revolutions themselves. We should 
also note that we will focus on the emergence of new management models, and as a result, 
we pay less attention to their persistence or the subsequent emergence of related 
management concepts in the ǯǤ 
Technological revolutions are based on general purpose technologies. The 
appearance of such technologies portend massive changes in the entire industrial 
landscape. According to the neo-Schumpeterians, technological revolutions generate a ǲclusterǳ (reprising the term used by Schumpeter (1939: 167)) of inter-related 
revolutionary products, production processes, and infrastructure (e.g., highways for 
automobiles, telecommunication and internet for microprocessors), giving rise first to new 
core industries and then diffusing to older industries. Table 1 summarizes Perezǯs 
chronology of these revolutions. We should note that the US took the lead in the last three, 
whereas in the first two, the UK was the locus of the original technological breakthroughs. 
--- Table 1: Timeline of technological revolutions --- 
The effective utilization of the revolutionary new technologies in the new core 
industries and their diffusion to older industries require change at both the broader 
institutional level and the firm level. Given this paperǯs motivating question, we focus on 
the latter. At the firm level, the uptake of the new technologies is accelerated by the 
emergence and adoption of a new techno-economic paradigm, that is, ǲa best practice 
model for the most effective use of the new technologies within and beyond the new 
industriesǳ (Perez, 2010: 185). Prior work by Perez (2002) and Freeman (2008) sketched 
some of the key technological and economic elements of these paradigms, but had little to 
say about the properly organizational and managerial elements. Our premise in the present 
paper is that this neo-Schumpeterian framework provides an effective scaffolding within 
which to build a robust account of the evolution of management models. 
Neo-Schumpeterians divide the life-cycle of these technological revolutions into 
distinct periods (Perez, 2002). Let us review these periods briefly. 
First, before the developmental potential of new technological breakthroughs is 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Nelson and Winter (1982), and other strands, see Fagerberg (2003). For a parallel periodization 
of long waves aǯǡȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
Silverberg (2007) for a skeptical review of efforts to interpret these waves as cycles with any Ǥǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?Ȍ strong 
theory about the linkage between techno-economic paradigms and macro-economic waves, nor 
any strong theory about the timing of revolutions themselves.  
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broadly recognized as such, each technological revolution goes through a gestation period, 
during which the future core technologies emerge and evolve. This period is highly variable 
in duration.3 
At some point, the installation period begins, during which new industries and a 
new facilitating infrastructure begin to take shape around the most successful of the new 
technologies. (The beginning and duration of this period is affected by technological, 
economic, and social circumstances.) Radical innovations are embodied in successful 
exemplary products, which spark the imagination of entrepreneurs and draws attention 
from investorsȄfor example, Fordǯs model T in the 1910s, and Intelǯs microprocessor in 
the 1970s. Corresponding new process and infrastructure technologies emerge and cohere 
around new core industries. A new techno-economic paradigm begins to emerge. 
The full exploitation of the technological revolutionǯs developmental potential 
across the rest of the economy is, however, limited, because the contextȄboth the broader 
political-economic institutional structures of society, and the dominant economic, 
organizational, and management practices of firmsȄwas formed in the prior wave under 
the impact of the previous technological revolution, and this context is ill-suited to the new 
technologies.4 This tension eventually provokes institutional and organizational change, 
which opens the way for the deployment period. Here, guided by the new techno-economic 
paradigm, the revolution diffuses beyond the lead industries into the older, previously 
established industries. This diffusion is, of course, uneven: some industries and firms adopt 
the new paradigm and are thoroughly revolutionized in both their technologies and their 
organizational formsȄthese industries ǲ-ǳ (Abernathy, Clark, and 
Kantrow, 1983)Ȅwhile others may find a niche for themselves in the new order, 
proceeding unchanged or adapting and implementing only elements of the new paradigm. 
Finally, the revolution enters a period of exhaustion. The paradigm can no longer 
drive productivity or stimulate innovation and growth because the developmental 
potential of the new technologies is largely fulfilled and innovations show an increasingly 
incremental character (for the distinction between radical and incremental innovation see 
Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Dosi, 1982). Where, for example, the automobile 
revolution gave us the combustion-engine-powered vehicle in the late nineteenth and early 
                                                        
3  This makes it difficult to select a clear start-date for each revolution. As a result, several neo-
Schumpeterian studies (e.g., Freeman and Perez, 1988; Tylecote, 1992) refer to a starting period 
rather than a specific year. 
4   Perez (2002, 2007, 2010) argued that during the installation period, while the rest of the 
economy still cannot absorb the new techno-economic paradigm, enthusiasm prevails within the 
new core industries. As a result, she argues, on the one hand, investors crowd into the leading 
industries to fund the exciting new opportunities, and any existing regulatory constraints are 
deliberately weakened to encourage more investments. The result is typically a financial 
bubbleȄǮǮǳ  ? ? ? ?ǡǮǮǳ of the 1840s and early 1850s, ǮǮ ? ? ? ?ǡǳ ǮǮǳ of the 1990s and 2000s. The installation period 
thus typically culminates in a major financial and socio-economic crisis, which also represents 
an inflexion point in the wave of paradigm change. After the crisis is resolved, we see a return to 
economic stability and macro-economic growth, the re-regulation and re-stabilization of the 
financial markets, and the paradigm moves into the deployment phase, reaching across the 
broader industrial landscape. 
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twentieth century, later in the twentieth century it offered incremental refinements such as 
air conditioning or automatic transmission. It is this exhaustion of a revolution that, 
according to the neo-Schumpeterians (for example Perez 2007, 2010), energizes 
technological innovation efforts in new directions.  
A PRELIMINARY HISTORICAL SKETCH  
 Taking this account of technological revolutions as our starting point, this section 
traces the corresponding shifts in organizational paradigms, management models, and 
management concepts. The following paragraphs offer a compressed, historically-informed 
narrative for each major wave of technological revolution, and situate the major 
management models within them: Table 2 summarizes. This narrative provides the 
empirical foundation for the theorization we propose in the subsequent section. 
--- Table 2: Revolutions, paradigms, models, concepts --- 
The water power and iron revolution 
 We begin with the technological revolution based on water power and iron, which 
was incubated during the 1750s, took off in the 1770s, and had exhausted itself by the 
1840s. This was the initial revolution that launched the entire period known as the ǲǡǳit predated the historical emergence of deliberate organization 
change efforts.  
 The British engineer John Smeaton was a key player in this revolution, improving 
the design and efficiency of water wheels by using iron instead of wood. He also acted as a 
consulting engineer for large iron producers who used water as a power source (Freeman 
and Louçã, 2001). Smeaton focused exclusively on the technological challenges of this new 
paradigm. In contrast, his contemporary, British engineer and pottery entrepreneur Josiah 
Wedgwood, was an innovator not only in technology but also in management, being one of 
the first industrialists to give sustained attention to the organizational form of enterprises 
(Pollard, 1965; Langton, 1984). 
Wedgwood established some of the first principles of factory organization, most 
notably in moving from a craft form of organization to extensive task specialization so as to 
ensure efficiency and quality for large batch production (Langton, 1984; Freeman and 
Soete, 1997; Freeman and Louçã, 2001). He was guided by a machine metaphorȄǲǳȋ	­ ȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?ȌȌ. 
Wedgwoodǯs ideas, however, diffused very little across industry. One impediment to 
diffusion was the locational dependence of water-power-based production on streams and 
local topography (Rosenberg and Trajtenberg, 2004; Seidel, 1976). This dependence kept 
owner-inventorsǯ development and optimization efforts focused on technical, 
environmental and local political challenges rather than organization principles. The great 
majority of owner-inventors relied on their own intuitions in organizing their business and 
on traditionalistic models of craft. As a result, no widely-shared professional management 
model was established in the UK during this revolution (Pollard, 1965; see also Landes 
(2003: 337) ǲ ǳ). 
In the US, the situation was similar: while some more self-reflective approaches to 
management and organization could be found in the plantations, water-powered textile 
industry, and armories, such examples had little impact on other industries (Chandler, 
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1972, 1977). 
The steam power and railways revolution 
 The steam-power and railways revolution spanned the 1790s through 1890s. In its 
first decades, the British inventor James Watt was a key actor. Watt created an effective and 
widely applicable power source by developing a fuel-efficient and profitable model of 
steam engine (Seidel, 1976; Nuvolari, 2004). Together with the entrepreneur Matthew 
Boulton, Watt started a small technical consulting business, which marketed his patent-
protected engine and sold it to Cornish copper and tin mine entrepreneurs (Seidel, 1976). 
After the expiration of Wattǯs patent, Cornish mine entrepreneurs established a network 
among themselves, and used a monthly journal to exchange knowledge. This triggered a 
stream of innovations improving the efficiency of steam engines in their mines (Nuvolari, 
2004). Watt and the people around him, like Smeaton before them, focused mainly on 
technology, and this period, like the preceding one, yielded no widely-shared management 
model. 
American entrepreneurs were initially much slower in deploying steam engine 
technology than their British counterparts. From the late 1820s onwards, however, the 
availability of inexpensive anthracite coal and iron permitted the far more rapid adoption 
of steam engine technology in the US (Chandler, 1972). Nowhere was the US catch-up and 
overtaking more visible than in the vast expansion of the US railway industry in the mid-
19th century, creating and utilizing the infrastructure for moving goods and people between 
the West and East of the USA (Chandler, 1977, 1990).  
The use of steam power in railway locomotives brought organizational and 
managerial issues into the limelight. The steam locomotive provided fast, regular, and 
dependable transportation and lowered radically the unit cost of moving goods, especially 
where locomotives could run on geographically expansive railroad networks. The railroads 
received a powerful assist from the telegraph, which provided fast and dependable long-
distance transmission of information. However, full utilization of the new technologies was 
limited by the absence of a management model that would enable firms to cope with the 
size and complexity of single-track networks. Lacking such a model, railways experienced 
diseconomies of scale and major train accidents (Chandler, 1965, 1977).  
The main actors involved in solving this organizational and managerial problem 
were civil engineers such as Benjamin Latrobe (at the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad), Daniel 
McCollum (at the Erie Railroad) and J. Edgar Thomson (at the Pennsylvania Railroad) 
(Ward, 1975; Chandler 1977). These civil engineers became examples of a ǲnew type of 
businessmanǳ (Chandler 1977: 95)Ȅthe salaried manager who advanced to the highest 
leadership positions without the benefits of ownership or family ties to the owner. To deal 
with the scale and complexity of the railways, and a resulting need for coordination, these 
professional managers developed new organizational and operational principles, 
specifically a structure in which divisional ǲsuperintendentsǳ operated with considerable 
autonomy from headquarters staff, as well as an organizational chart to illustrate more 
clearly the relations of authority and communication between these managers (Chandler, 
1965, 1977). These innovations were integrated in what we call the ǲLine-and-Staffǳ model.  
As Chandler notes (1977: 105), earlier texts on the management of large-scale 
enterprises focused entirely on the control of workers; with the railways, we see the first 
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model of the control of line managers by a corporate staff down through several layers of 
management. This model encompassed and synthesized several more specific management 
concepts regarding financial, capital, and cost accounting, functional differentiation, and 
clear principles of delegation and reporting (Chandler, 1977). The new management model 
gave initial expression to a new paradigm of organization, one that differed qualitatively 
from the prevailing traditionalistic paradigm which was based on a combination of owner-
entrepreneur, family enterprise, and craftsman-apprentice. We call this new organizational 
paradigm the ǲProfessionally-managed firm.ǳ  
The new management model and the organizational paradigm that it inaugurated 
emerged in large companies such as the Erie Railroad for which the need for professional 
managers was particularly pronounced, and then diffused across the railroad industry. 
Driven by the challenge of coordinating rail operations among the distinct companies 
spanning the USA, middle managers from these companies cooperated in developing new 
technical and operating standards, and the model diffused via numerous meetings, industry 
magazines, and books, becoming standard practice by the 1870s. A key part of the new 
model was codified and diffused in the form of an organizational chart for the management 
of railway companies that was developed by Daniel McCollum (Chandler, 1977; Yates, 
1989). The business editor Henry Poor published and popularized McCallumǯs 
organizational innovation in his American Railroad Journal, selling copies of the 
organizational chart (Chandler, 1956, 1965, 1977). Railroad Managers often moved to 
other industries and brought the model with them. Andrew Carnegie, for example, was a 
former manager at the Pennsylvania Railroad, with Thomson as a mentor, before he 
applied the Line-and-Staff model to the steel industry and became one of its leading figures 
(Wren and Greenwood, 1998).  
The professionalization of management was one of the factors that enabled the US 
railway companies to become the largest business enterprises in the world (Chandler, 
1977), and led to high profits and vast power for its stockholders and managers (Ward, 
1975), but also to a ǲgrowing gap between the management and the workerǳ (Nelson, 
1995: 121). Management paid scant attention to employees' working and living conditions 
(Tolman, 1909; Kaufman, 2008). When railroad mania years were followed by years of 
crisis when workersǯ salaries were reduced even while stockholdersǯ dividends remained 
high (Ward, 1975), violent strikes erupted. Two of the most prominent were the one at the 
Erie Railroad in 1857 (Wren and Greenwood, 1998) and the Great Railroad Strike of 1877 
(Kaufman, 2008).  
Shaken by theses disruptions, some railway shareholders and railroad executives 
such as the railway magnate Cornelius Vanderbuilt sought ways to avoid future outbreaks. 
They initiated efforts in what was later called ǲindustrial bettermentǳ or ǲwelfare workǳ 
(Rudin, 1972; Brandes, 1976). In the last three decades of the 19th century, these efforts 
gave rise to the creation of numerous Young Menǯs Christian Association (YMCA) centers at 
major railroad stations across the country, offering railroad workers food, shelter, baths, 
libraries, athletic facilities, classes on railroad work, bible classes and religious meetings. ǲThe underlying theory was that well-housed, well-fed, clean, properly educated Christians 
do not strikeǳ (Brandes, 1976: 15). By 1890, Industrial Betterment programs had been 
adopted in several other industries (Brandes, 1976). 
If the Line-and-Staff model inaugurated a revolution in the dominant organizational 
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paradigm, these Industrial Betterment programs represented an effort to stabilize the new 
paradigmȄaiming not to undo the Line-and-Staff model, but rather to mitigate its lack of 
attention for employees' working and living conditions (Tolman, 1909). The main actors 
involved in developing this paradigm-balancing model were the new ǲwelfare secretariesǳ 
(Brandes, 1976; Kaufman, 2008). The creation of the function of welfare secretary can be 
seen as a social counterpart to the technical- and business-oriented function of the 
professional manager. As staff members, welfare secretaries were incorporated into the 
Line-and-Staff model. In some firms, their focus was entirely on the workersǯ lives outside 
workȄa form of social work; in other firms, they played roles that prefigured those of the 
later generation of personnel managers (Tolman, 1909; Kaufman, 2008).  
Three organizations were particularly significant in delineating the function of 
welfare secretary and the practice of welfare work and in diffusing them across different 
industries: the YMCA, the National Civic Federation, and ǯǯNew York City based Institute of Social Service (Kaufman, 2008). These 
organizations educated welfare secretaries, sponsored conferences, published ǲsuccess 
stories,ǳ and gave consulting advice to clients. The function of welfare secretary would 
evolve and become one of the starting points of personnel management and Human 
resource management, thereby having a lasting and pervasive impact on management 
(Kaufman, 2008). 
The steel and electric power revolution 
 Before about 1860, steel was expensive, its use reserved mainly for tools, luxury 
cutlery, and swords. The steel and electric power revolution (approx. 1850sȂ1940s) begins 
with the replacement of the traditional crucible process of steel-making by the Bessemer 
and open-heath processes, which allowed for much larger volumes at much lower costs. 
Demand exploded, since steel is characterized by a significantly higher tensile and 
compression strength than iron and is therefore the superior material for many 
applications. Steel became the material of choice for railroads, bridges, city infrastructures, 
buildings, and military equipment. The effectiveness of machine tools was often 
considerably improved by incorporating steel materials and tools, which allowed them to 
operate at much higher speeds even under steam power. Electric power for such machine 
tools and other production equipment soon allowed equipment to be used far more 
effectively and factories to be laid out far more efficiently, no longer constrained by the 
central location of a steam-power generator (Devine, 1983). The arrival of a more efficient 
factory organization allowed a qualitative jump in productivity (David, 1990; on this 
revolution, see also Devine, 1983; Freeman and Louçã, 2001; Perez, 2002.) 
 It was during the installation period of this revolution that the organizational 
challenges posed by new technologies became the focus of sustained attention. Effective 
exploitation of the new technologies was initially limited by industryǯs widespread reliance 
on craft-like variants of traditionalistic management (Aitken, 1960; Nelson, 1980). Factory 
operations were typically led by multiple, independent internal-contractors, each of whom 
hired and managed their own crews (often from their extended family), contracted with 
the owners to supply a given amount of output for a given price, and relied on their own 
traditional methods to achieve that output. Thus, the typical factory ǲǳǲǳȋǡ
1995: 35; see also Litterer, 1963).The dramatic growth in demand for steel enabled by the 
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new technologies threw into sharp relief the need for more scientific planning of 
workstation operations, of workflows between workstations, and of machine and tool 
maintenance (Freeman and Louca, 2001: 232-236; for an instructive example of the 
interrelation between technological and organizational innovations see Aitken, 1960: 102-
3;). The prior Professionally-managed firm paradigm had formalized the functions of 
management, but that paradigm and its associated Line-and-Staff and Industrial 
Betterment models did not offer an answer to this new type of problem.  
In the last decades of the 19th century, Taylor was one of the key figures among the 
emerging community of mechanical engineers and engineering consultants who identified 
and addressed this problem, and who suggested various new management concepts as 
solutions (Aitken, 1960; Nelson, 1980, 1992; 
ƴ, 1994; Nadworny, 1957). From the 
competition and cooperation among these actors, Taylor eventually emerged as 
preeminent. Taylor attacked the underlying problem both technologically and 
organizationally. Through an unprecedented program of systematic engineering 
experimentation, he discovered a new way of tempering steel (for which he received a 
famous patent, albeit later rescinded), and invented a new high-speed cutting tool that used 
this steel to increase the machine-ǯspeed from 90 to 250 revolutions per minute 
(Kanigel, 2005). The same spirit of systematic experimentation guided his organizational 
innovation efforts, resulting in time-and-motion studies, new principles in plant layout, and 
rationalized incentive payments (Nelson, 1975b).  
The new Scientific Management model inaugurated the Factory as a new 
organizational paradigm based on the exemplars of Midvale Steel and Bethlehem Steel 
(Nelson, 1980). This new paradigm was characterized by the unitary, centralized 
organization structure with a workflow designed to optimize and accelerate production 
across an interdependent set of operationsȄa radical shift in focus from that of the prior 
paradigm on the rational design of the management superstructure.5 
 Taylor subsequently disseminated Scientific Management through his books 
(Taylor, 1911), lectures, and consulting for companies. After the failure of his efforts to 
mobilize the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) for the diffusion of this new 
approach, Taylor brought together a community of like-minded reformers (e.g., Carl Barth, 
Morris L. Cooke, Henry Gantt, and Frank Gilbreth) in the Society to Promote the Science of 
Management (renamed the Taylor Society after Taylorǯs death in 1915), which established 
itself as an important forum for discussion and publication of more specific management 
concepts and tools for efficiency-oriented consulting (Aitken, 1960; Kaufman, 2008). 
Scientific Management was also given a major boost by the World War One efforts at 
industrial planning (Bruce, 1995).  
 Taylor worked mainly in companies associated with the core new industries of this 
technological revolution (e.g., Midvale Steel Company, Bethlehem Iron Company). In these 
                                                        
5    ǲǤǳǡthat applied 
Scientific Management ideas were professionally managed. Our differentiation of the Factory 
and Professionally-managed firm as distinct paradigms does not mean to imply that they are 
mutually exclusive, any more than Einsteinian physics obviates the value of Newtonian physics. 
These organizational paradigms simply bring different features of the enterprise into the 
foreground. 
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core industries, the dominant organizational and management problemȄhow to accelerate 
operations beyond what was possible under the traditionalistic craft form of work 
organizationȄemerged earlier than in other industries. It was the historical novelty of the 
motivating problem that explains the need for time-consuming experiments in Taylorǯs 
early organization change efforts at Midvale Steel Company. Taylorǯs version of the 
Scientific Management solution preserved something of this spirit of experimentation and 
exploration: his work as a change-agent typically involved lengthy phases of analysis and 
experimentation, and he was hostile to those who sought to distill Scientific Management 
into a set of standardized solutions (as evidenced by his recommendations to the 
consultants working at the Watertown Arsenal: see Aitken, 1960).  
 This type of organization change process, however, severely limited the speed and 
extent of diffusion of Scientific Management. The new modelǯs diffusion was greatly 
accelerated by larger consultancies such as Charles Bedauxǯs (Nelson, 1995). Bedaux was 
born 30 years after Taylor. He became part of the wider Scientific Management network in 
the early 1910s. By then, the economic crisis of the 1890s had been resolved, socio-
economic circumstances had stabilized, and the macro-economic conditions for a broad 
diffusion of Scientific Management were more favorable. The dominant organizational and 
management problem was defined more narrowly (as the ǲefficiency problemǳ) and 
Scientific Management was accepted as the solution to it (Nelson, 1992). The number of 
companies that asked for external help in implementing the first new management model 
of this age was much higher than in the age of the railways (Nelson, 1995), which led to the 
birth of the consultancy industry, with the Bedaux consultancy as its first leading company 
(Kreis, 1992; Kipping, 2002). In contrast to Taylor, Bedaux did not undertake a search for a 
new model of management, but instead applied a very simplified variant of Scientific 
Management methodology that led to relatively quick results. It focused on time studies to 
identify bottlenecks and set production standards, and installed an incentive wage system 
that pressured workers for greater output (Nelson, 1995). Some of the other Scientific 
Management consultants, such as Harrington Emerson, employed approaches that were 
more faithful ǯ; but all of them confronted the need to simplify in order 
to grow their businesses profitably. Bedaux and his employees used their approach for a 
large number of clients from a wide circle of industries (and later in different countries) 
(
ƴ, 1994). The difference between Taylor and Bedaux exemplifies the early phase of a 
deepening division of labor within the overall network of actors involved in the 
development and diffusion of new management models: between (a) the innovator-theorist 
(in this case, Taylor), and (b) larger consultancies (such as Bedaux) which focus on 
dissemination in order to grow their businesses.  
The wider application of Scientific Management frequently had dysfunctional side-
effects, particularly in the form of high turnover and low morale of workers (e.g., Lewin, 
1920; Gillespie, 1991) and vociferous (although not unanimous) union opposition (see 
Aitkin, 1960; Jacoby, 1983a). Many of ǯd that Scientific Management 
was not hostile to workers or unions (Nyland, 1998); but it was often implemented in ways 
workers resented and resisted (Bendix, 1956: 274-287; Aitkin, 1960).  
The source of this strife was different from that experienced by the railroads in the 
previous period. The earlier Line-and-Staff model had focused on the management 
structure rather than on workerǯ tasks; the labor troubles that ensued were taken to be 
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due to management's ignorance of the deterioration of ǯworking 
conditions; and the Industrial Betterment remedy was primarily to add a social function 
among the staff responsible for ǯ. By contrast, the 
Scientific Management model aimed directly at the wage-effort bargain; and the ensuing 
strife was fueled by ǯǯefforts to take control over how 
and how fast workers would execute those tasks. 
From among the various management concepts that developed in response to these 
problems, Elton ǯFritz Roethlisbǯversion of Human Relations emerged as 
the dominant model.6 The main actors involved in Human Relations were social scientists 
and personnel managers (see 
ƴ, 1994).7 In the 1920s and early 1930s, social 
scientists Mayo and Roethlisberger developed and conceptualized personnel counseling as 
a remedy to Scientific Managementǯs dysfunctions at the Hawthorne factory of Western 
Electric ȋǯgers such as 
William J. Dickson). Here, supervisors attempted to influence individual workersǯ attitudes 
so as to (re-)create greater harmony and sense of community within the company 
(Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939; Bendix, 1956: 308-319; Gillespie, 1991). With this, 
Human Relation theorists sought to counter-balance what they saw as the alienating effects 
of Scientific Managementǯs time-and-motion regimentation and incentive payment systems. 
 Both the Scientific Management and Human Relations models eventually diffused 
widely across US industry, aided considerably by the Training Within Industry (TWI) 
program conducted during World War Two (War Manpower Commission, 1945; Gillespie, 
1991; Robinson and Schroeder, 1993; Breen, 2002). TWI was a government-subsidized, 
non-profit network that trained supervisors from over 16,000 plants all over the USA, 
having a major impact on the rapid expansion of US industry during World War Two. It 
brought together several actors and organizations (among others, Scientific Management 
experts such as Clifton H. Cox, personnel managers, researchers on Human Relations such 
                                                        
6   Iǯǯǡ
Lewin created a distinctive set of concepts to deal with the dysfunctional side-effects of Scientific Ǥǯ dynamic concepts that he 
and his colleagues developed. His Research Center for Group Dynamics was financed by 
government and other non-profit sources. Here, the focus was on as-yet unresolved problems 
(see Lewin, 1944; Marrow, 1969). It was only later that students of Lewin such as Lippitt, Benne, 
and Bradford developed a more scalable tool, in the form of group dynamics training. Their 
home base was the National Training Laboratories (NTL), which undertook less research than ǯtead on training for a larger number of clients (see Cummings and 
Worley, 2009). Many ǯlater contributed to the 
Organization Development movement (see e.g., Cummings and Worley, 2009), which was 
subsequently connectǮǮǳ (Argyris and Schön, 1978) and ǮǮǳ (Schein, 1985). Organization Development constituted a far-flung 
network of change agents working primarily in paradigm-balancing problem-solving efforts (see 
Cooke and Cox, 2005). 
7 The 1930s saw a surge in the creation of personnel departments, often evolving out of welfare 
departments (Kaufman, 2008). They deployed personnel counseling alongside a broader set of ǲǳ (Jacoby, 
1983b), such as centralized personal administration, job analysis, and promotion ladders. 
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as Roethlisberger, union and company representatives), with the aim of rationalizing US 
industry to assure wartime production. It is particularly telling for our account that TWI 
did not treat Human Relations as incompatible with Scientific Management. On the 
contrary, TWI deliberately sought to integrate the two approaches and facilitated their 
respective ǯprograms and materials. ǯ ǲJob 
Methodsǳ module was based on Scientific Management, and the ǲJob Relationsǳ module was 
a simplified and codified version of the Human Relations personnel counseling method. A 
second strand of explicit synthesis was proposed by the sociotechnical system approach ǲǳǲǳ
Human Relations (see Trist and Bamforth, 1951; Emery and Trist, 1969; Cummings, 1978). 
Notwithstanding some rhetorical gestures suggesting a more radical goal, and 
notwithstanding the declared hostility of some Human Relations advocates to Scientific 
Management, the Human Relations model did not have the effect of displacing Scientific 
Management, but rather helped to accommodate workers to the new organizational 
paradigm inaugurated by the Scientific Management model (see Mayo, 1924). Industrialists 
such as John D. Rockefeller, Jr exerted significant influence in Mayoǯs Human Relations 
network and strongly supported this role for Human Relations (OǯConner, 1999; Bruce and 
Nyland, 2011; Hassard, 2012). In this sense, Human Relations was what we call a paradigm-
balancing model rather than a paradigm-revolutionizing one. Where Scientific Management 
represented an effort to adjust the organization to a radical technological changeȄ
reestablishing what organization theorists call environmental, or external fitȄHuman 
Relations represented an effort to realign the elements of organization to better fit each 
otherȄreestablishing internal fit (using the distinction made by Miller, 1992). 
The automobile and oil revolution 
 The subsequent wave of technological revolution (approx. 1880sȂ1980s) 
introduced the automobile powered by internal combustion engine; the development of 
assembly-line technology in that automobile industry (famously associated with Fordǯs 
Model T) and then in others; the use of oil as a core input; the resulting explosion in 
demand for automobiles by both industry and households; and the creation of networks of 
highways as part of the new transport infrastructure (Perez, 2002).8 However, this 
generalization of mass production and mass consumption was out of sync with the 
inherited context at both the macro-societal and organizational levels, so it led to 
                                                        
8   Two points of clarification are pertinent here. First, this revolution also saw a generalization of 
the use of electricity. Electricity is an example of a general-purpose technology that was, in 
different forms, important in several successive technological revolutionsȄelectricity for 
powering machine tools and other factory equipment; then for automobiles, cities, and homes; 
and finally for microelectronics for computers. Second, the final period of the steel and electric 
power revolution (approx. 1918sȂ1940s) and the installation period of the automobile and oil 
revolution (approx. 1908Ȃ1929) overlapped, just as later the final period of the automobile and 
oil revolution overlaps with the installation period of the computer and telecommunications 
revolution. As a result, Human Relations and Strategy-and-Structure also overlapped. This is ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǣ-
and-Structure emerged at the same time as Human RelationsȄnot in response to it, but in 
response to a whole different set of problems. 
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increasing market instability in the 1920s and 1930s (see Fligstein, 1990). The unitary 
functional organization structure of the paradigm we called the Factory, with its inherited 
orientation toward single product lines, could not respond effectively to the growing 
diversity of expanding consumer needs. Firms needed a more flexible and more market-
focused organizational form, one that was geared towards changing markets, rapid product 
development, and manufacturing and marketing on an increasingly global scale.  
The main actors involved in developing this new management model were 
managers, management theorists, and management consultants associated with the 
automobile industry and other industries in the core of this technological revolution (see 
ƴ, 1994). Managers such as Alfred Sloan at General Motors recognized the inadequacy 
of the inherited organizational paradigm, and they searched for solutions within their 
companies. Sloan's search for a solution was based on the expectation that the diffusion of 
automobiles ǲǳȋǡ ? ? ? ?: 43), one that would 
involve many more, and more diverse, consumers. His solution, developed in the 1920s, 
was a radically new management model in which differentiated market segments would be 
assigned to distinct, more or less self-contained, business divisionsȄthe Strategy-and-
structure model. This management model allowed General Motors to pursue a strategy of 
product differentiation ȋǲ cǳ (Sloan, 1964: 438)) and shared 
parts, and thereby to overtake Ford as the preeminent firm in the automobile industry 
(Chandler, 1962). It also inaugurated a new organizational paradigm: the multi-divisional 
Corporation replaced the unitary Factory as the paradigmatic frame of reference. 
The diffusion of this model across the new core industries helped to unleash rapid 
productivity increases and contributed to the dynamism of the ǲroaring 1920s;ǳ but the 
institutional framework was out of sync with these dynamics and (with several other 
factors contributing too) the Great Depression ensued (Perez, 2002). ǯ
organizational innovation occurred before the Great Depression, it was only after the 
radical institutional reforms of the New Deal and World War II and after the stabilization of 
the post-war macro-economic context that the Strategy-and-Structure model, with General 
Motors as a paradigmatic exemplar, could diffuse beyond the core industries. 
The management theorist Peter Drucker (1946) was among the first to generalize 
and elaborate the innovative solution developed at General Motors, articulating and 
theorizing its core concepts. It is indicative of the gap between innovator and theorist that 
within GM itself Druckerǯs theorization was criticized as a misleading oversimplification 
(see Sloan, 1964). Drucker helped to disseminate this Strategy-and-Structure model 
through publications and through his practice as an individual consultant. He also led 
training sessions for junior consultants of McKinsey in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
(Edersheim, 2004). Like Taylor, however, Drucker saw organization change as an 
exploratory process (Drucker, 1954), and this type of practice yielded only slow diffusion. 
Management consultancies took up the challenge of further codifying the new 
model, and firms such as McKinsey eventually came to dominate its diffusion (Kipping, 
2002; McKenna, 2006). Treating the underlying organizational and management problem 
as basically resolved by these solutions, these consultancies shifted from the innovation 
orientation of Sloan and Drucker to a diffusion orientation, disseminating the results of the 
prior innovation and theorization efforts in the form of best-practice templates to a large 
number of corporations that faced similar problems. McKinseyǯs main intervention tools 
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were the General Survey Outline and a growing store of best-practice exemplars. The 
consultancy recruited new employees from prestigious business schools, developed an 
elaborate internal hierarchy of consultants, and cultivated a network of repeat-business 
clients. This system enabled the multiplication of interventions with clients in many 
industries and, increasingly over time, in many countries (Bhide, 1996; Edersheim, 2004).  
The development and diffusion of the new management model involved a division of 
labor between (a) the problem articulator and innovator (Sloan), who contributed to the 
creation of a solution for the dominant problem, (b) the guru-theorist (Drucker), who 
contributed to the theorization of this solution and transforming it thereby into a 
management tool, and (c) larger consultancies (e.g., McKinsey), which further simplified 
this tool in order to grow their businesses.  
For a long period, the Strategy-and-Structure model, enhanced by management 
concepts such as Operations Research, ǲmarched from victory to victoryǳ (Womack, Jones, 
and Roos, 1990: 43), and the success of US companies in the world market distracted 
enthusiastic proponents of the model from its dysfunctional aspects (Dertouzos, Lester, 
and Solow, 1989; Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990). Despite the development of 
management concepts such as matrix management, and despite efforts to match 
organizational structure to ǲcontingency factorsǳ (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Woodward 
1965; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), these dysfunctions lead to poor quality and service, low 
worker involvement, and lack of cooperation and political gamesmanship within the 
management ranks. When global competition intensified as Japan and Germany rebuilt 
after World War Two and reasserted their industrial strength in the 1970s and 1980s, it 
was no longer possible to ignore these problems (see Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow, 1989).  
 In this new context, different and partially intertwined problem-solving efforts 
emerged, each addressing one or more of these dysfunctions. Alongside management 
concepts such as the ǲLearning OrganizationǳȋÚǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǡǲOrganizational Cǳȋǡ ? ? ? ?), the most popular of these balancing problem-
solving efforts was the one associated with the quality movement (see Cole, 1998, 1999). 
(The dominance of this framing is clearly visible in the data underlying Table 2 above, 
where references to ǲǳǲquality ǳ
those to ǲorganizational cultureǳ or ǲorganizational learning.ǳȌ  
 The new Quality Management model, with Total Quality Management (TQM) as the 
key concept, borrowed extensively from the rising Japanese competitors. Indeed, when the 
organizational and management problem of quality improvement came to the fore in the 
US, it had already been addressed in Japan (Cole, 1998; Winter, 2000). After the Second 
World War, the Japanese automobile industry was in a deep crisis. A series of 
organizational innovations would lead to the emergence of what was later called the 
Toyota Production System. In the course of defining and resolving the challenges faced by 
Toyota, its chief engineer Taiichi Ohno (1988) criticized management practices that led 
supervisors and shop-floor personnel to prioritize production over quality. Fearful of 
negatively impacting productivity, workers and foremen typically passed errors 
downstream rather than call attention to them. Ohno pointed out that this practice was 
ultimately wasteful. The mobilization of shop-floor personnel for eliminating waste and 
improving quality became core elements of the Toyota Production System and its 
associated management system (Ohno, 1988; Liker, Fruin, and Adler, 1999).  
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 In contrast with these Japanese practices, US firms had long relied on staff experts to 
track quality and set quality targets. These targets were set to ǲǳbased on the 
assumption that quality and productivity were in a trade-off relationship. Japanese 
competition brought both an awareness that competitive advantage could be derived from 
shifting this trade-off (to this extent, ǲǡǳCrosby (1980)), and to effect 
this trade-off shift, primary responsibility for quality should be shifted from staff to line 
personnel. Quality theorists such as Deming, Juran, and Ishikawa argued this prioritization 
of qualǯ (Cole, 1999). Acting as 
bridges between Japan and the US, they developed a set of management tools aimed at 
quality improvement, later popularized as TQM (Hackman and Wageman, 1995). The 
efforts of these change-agents were constrained by the arrogance of established (US) 
industry leaders when faced with upstart (Japanese) challengers (Cole, 1999). Over time, 
however, the quality movement developed a broad following impressed by its capacity to 
address the quality-related dysfunctions of the Strategy-and-Structure approach while ǯȄthe divisionalized firm, with financial and 
strategic but not operational controls over the operating divisions, and with bureaucratized 
internal labor markets.  
 The Quality Management model shared some features with Human Relations, 
notably a concern with employee attitudes; but the differences are also striking. Where 
Human Relations was focused on individual employees and motivated by concern with 
their alienation and resistance to task control, Quality Management was motivated by 
process and product quality and focused on teams and their engagement with this 
dimension of their work. 
One of the main mechanisms for diffusing the new Quality Management model 
became the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award (for others see Cole, 1999). Created 
in the US in 1987 as a joint venture between the government, scholars and leading 
companies in industry (Garvin, 1991; Cole, 1998), the Baldrige system synthesized the 
overlapping principles and techniques of a host of theorists and quality gurus. When a 
growing number of US industries came under intense and global competitive pressure in 
the 1980s and 1990s, Baldrige offered them an iterative process of learning, 
implementation, and practice that promised superior performance (Cole, 1998). It spread 
from core manufacturing industries to the service sector, including finance, schools, 
hospitals, and government. 
 The division of labor here was similar to the one we saw in the Human Relations 
case. Innovators such as Ohno contributed to a creation of a solution. Theorists (Deming, 
Ishikawa) conceptualized TQM as a management tool. The Baldrige system established a 
network that linked actors from government, science and industry in disseminating this 
tool. Note however that the network of actors involved in developing the Baldrige system 
was considerably more diverse than in the case of TWI, and the result was a whole family 
of best-practice exemplars rather than a single standardized set of procedures.  
The computers and telecommunication revolution 
 The 1970s saw the beginnings of a new wave of technological revolution, having 
incubated during the 1950s and 1960s, and then taking off as the previous revolution 
moved into its exhaustion period. Successive innovations in microelectronics, computers, 
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the Internet, and eventually mobile telephones provided opportunities for new industries, 
a new infrastructure of digital and wireless networks, and much wider and cheaper access 
to information and communication pathways.  
 Identifying computers and telecommunication as the next technological revolution 
in the sequence is not particularly controversial; but identifying the corresponding 
organizational and managerial transformation is riskier. Efforts to put the more recent past 
in historical perspective always run the risk of premature assessment (Chandler, 1990: 
628). With that caveat, let us offer the following sketch as a working hypothesis. 
The new technologies enabled the emergence of more complex and dispersed 
organizing structures and relationships (networks, internal markets, outsourcing 
relationships, etc.), and the resulting organizational complexity called for some kind of 
rationalization. A variety of concepts emerged to fill that need, and to simplify and 
transform the way work was done. Conversely and simultaneously, the new technologies 
represented ǲǳǲǳǤIndeed, the implementation 
of new computer-based technologies initially yielded frustratingly limited improvement in 
organizational performance (see e.g., Zuboff, 1988). A host of economic indicators showed 
a disturbing lag in productivity gains during the 1970s and 1980s relative to massive wave 
of investment in information technologiesȄthe so-ǲǳ (Solow, 
1987; Short and Venkatraman, 1992). Effective exploitation of the new opportunities 
offered by IT would require expanding ITǯs role beyond support functions and expanding 
its functionality beyond the automation of stand-alone technical or administrative tasks. 
The key organizational and management problem was therefore how to use ICT to 
rationalize operations across broader spans and higher levels of decision-making, and to 
adapt accordingly organizational strategy, structure, systems, and processes 
(Venkatraman, 1991).  
The resolution of this problem led to the emergence of a paradigm-revolutionizing 
management model that we call the Business Process model. The Business Process model 
was initially dominated by two competing management concepts: the more prominent 
Business Process Reengineering (BPR) (Hammer, 1990; Hammer and Champy, 1993) and 
Business Process Redesign (Davenport and Short, 1990; Davenport, 1993). The common 
core was their ǲprocesǳȋǡ ? ? ? ?) which encouraged firms to 
rationalize not only the processes that linked activities but also the location of the 
organizational boundaries that separated those activities.  
The centrality of the Business Process model was buttressed by the emergence of 
the concept of "supply chain management" (Cooper, Lambert, and Pagh, 1997). IT tools 
were created to standardize interfaces and linkages and thus to facilitate the flow of 
information across boundaries both within and between firms (Lambert and Cooper, 2000; 
Sturgeon, 2002; GarcÇƴa-Dastugue and Lambert, 2003). Along with this change in 
organizational structure, strategy shifted its focus from ǲcorporate strategyǳ ǲǳ and ǲstrategic alliancesǳ (e.g., Gulati, 1998; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Ireland, 
Hitt, and Vaidyanath, 2002; Lavie,2006). (Kunda and Ailon-Soudayǯ (2005) ǲǳcovers much the same conceptual terrain as we 
associate with the Business Process model, without however linking ǲǳ
pendulum swing to the emergence of ICTs.)  
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The Business Process model thus inaugurated a radically new organizational 
paradigm, which we call the Network (Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Sturgeon, 2002).9 
This paradigm focused attention on network tiesȄwork and information flowsȄacross 
units within the enterprise as well as between the focal enterprise and other enterprises 
up- and down-stream (see Short and Venkatraman, 1992).  
The main actors contributing to the establishment of the new Business Process 
model and Network paradigm were IT specialists in companies, academia, and 
consultancies. BPR had its origins in a collective research project known as PRISM. In a 
series of case studies, the PRISM project brought together theorists (often working later as 
consultants) such as Thomas Davenport and Michael Hammer, practitioners such as 
Charles Sieloff at Hewlett-Packard (HP), Charles McCaig and Keith Glover at Mutual Benefit 
Life, and others at American Express and IBM, as well as consultants such as James 
Champy. During the project, these actors cooperated to define the problem, capture and 
theorize solutions, and develop dissemination approaches (Davenport and Short, 1990; 
Davenport, Prusak, and Wilson, 2003). The companies involved were often in the 
revolutionǯs core industries. Through this effort, Hammer, Champy, Davenport and Short 
theorized the organization innovations advanced by the IT practitioners and transformed 
them into a management model, reaching guru status when they published their respective 
articles and books (Davenport and Short, 1990; Hammer, 1990; Davenport, 1993; Hammer 
and Champy, 1993). The guru-theorists were further involved in supporting the practical 
dissemination of the Business Process model: Hammer created his own consultancy; 
Davenport has directed research centers of Accenture and other IT consultancies.  
 Large IT consultancies such as Champyǯs CSC Index and subsequently Andersen 
Consulting/Accenture played a key role in the diffusion of the Business Process model 
(Fincham, 1995; Fincham and Evans, 1999). Andersen/Accenture developed an elaborate, 
standardized consulting process to support this line of work. Their system relied on 
sophisticated IT support for conducting intervention steps and on modules of ready-made 
solutions. This standardization allowed them to conduct industrial-scale Business Process 
projects, profitably leveraging less experienced (and less expensive) consultants (Nanda, 
1995; Thompson, 2004; Falk, 2005). Eventually, enterprise-systems vendors such as SAP 
also came to play key roles in disseminating the Business Process model. They relied even 
more than large consultancies on generic best-practice exemplars that abstracted from 
companiesǯ specific needs (Davenport, Prusak, and Wilson, 2003).  
 We should acknowledge at this point that it is not self-evident that the Business 
Process model should be classed as a management model comparable in generality and 
                                                        
9  Of course, networks of organizations existed before and independently of the computers and 
communication revolution, for example in form of the pre-industrial European putting-out 
system (e.g., Mendels, 1972; Mokyr, 2001), 19th and early 20th industrial districts in the UK 
(e.g., Marshall, 1919), or the late 20th century interlinked microfirms in the Italian Emilian-
Romagna region (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Lazerson, 1995). However, all these examples Ǥǡǡǯ
transfer system (El Qorchi, Maimbo, & Wilson, 2003), span larger geographies without advanced 
technology, but rely on strong ethnic/religious ties. The establishment and worldwide diffusion 
of global supply chains only became possible on the basis of IT and telecommunication tools and 
infrastructure (Sturgeon, 2002). 
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pervasiveness to Scientific Management or Strategy-and-Structure. Its initially dominant 
concept, Business Process Reengineering, had a faddish quality, pushed aggressively by 
consultancies and then rapidly abandoned as a consulting product. We argue, however, that 
this model's process orientation lived on and was widely diffused, assisted by concepts 
such as Supply Chain Management. Davenport seems to support this interpretation:  ǲThe most profound lesson of business process reengineering was never reengineering, 
but business processes. Processes are how we work. Any company that ignores its 
business processes or fails to improve them risks its future. That said, companies can 
use many different approaches to process improvement without ever embarking on a 
high-risk reengineering projectǳ(Davenport, 1995: 74-75). 
Indeed, Business Process Reengineering was a contested concept from very early 
on. Through the 1980s and 1990s, one of the IT specialists involved, Sieloff from HP, argued 
that ǲknowledge managementǳ was more critical than the IT infrastructures that were 
emphasized by the most prominent BPR proponents (Sieloff, 1999: 47). Sieloffǯs point of 
view was captured in the aphorism, ǲIf only HP knew what HP knows.ǳ Davenport himself 
(Davenport, Prusak, and Wilson, 2003) criticized Hammer and Champyǯs version of BPR for ǯoverselling and oversimplifying BPR. BPR, the critics argued, 
had become an excuse for massive layoffs, and the failure rate of big BPR projects was 
distressingly high (see Champy, 1995, Davenport, 1995). These failures typically occurred 
when large consultancies designed radically new work processes without consulting the 
front-line practitioners who knew most about these processes, and without taking the time 
to redesign work processes that would fit the client organizationǯs specific needs 
(Davenport, Prusak, and Wilson, 2003). The factor driving this short-sightedness was, 
according to these critics, exacerbated competition for profit and growth among the 
consultancies (see Davenport, 1995; Davenport, Prusak, and Wilson, 2003).10 
The dysfunctional side-effects of the Business Process model were addressed by 
several different and partially intertwined problem-solving efforts. Perhaps the most 
prominent of these efforts was the one anticipated by Sieloff and known as Knowledge 
Management (e.g., Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Brown and 
Duguid, 2000). 11 One of the goals of Knowledge Management was to mitigate the risk that 
                                                        
10  We thank one of our reviewers for suggesting another factor: BPR was so focused on cost ǲǳ ?ǯǲǳȋ
exploitation/exploration distinction introduce by (March, 1991).  
11  We understand Knowledge Management here in a broad sense, as the cultivation of knowledge-
creating and knowledgeȂsharing communities of practice. Our argument is that Knowledge 
Management was ultimately driven by the computers and telecommunications revolution, but 
was deeply marked by its role as a (secondary-cycle) response to the deficiencies of the Business 
Process model, which was the prior (primary-cycle) response to that revolution. This 
interpretation is consistent with the history offered by Koenig and Neveroski (2008); but it is a 
hypothesis that needs further testing. An alternative hypothesis is that Knowledge Management 
is better understood as part of a distinct, primary-cycle-type response to that technological 
revolution. 
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Business Process-related reengineering, downsizing, and outsourcing programs would 
destroy the fabric of collective tacit knowledge shared among experienced employees both 
within and across interdependent firms.  
The key to accomplishing this was to re-establish, strengthen, and deploy the 
collective knowledge-generating and -sharing capacity of geographically- and 
organizationally-dispersed personnel working in related domains. The focus of Knowledge 
Management was thus broader than the focus on individuals or teams found in prior 
secondary model-development cycles. It was now on more diverse and extended 
collectivities, labeled by Lave and Wenger "communities of practice" (Lave and Wenger, 
1991; Wenger and Synyder 2000; see Brown and Duguid, 1991). 
As with the prior paradigm-balancing models of Industrial Betterment, Human 
Relations, and Quality Management, Knowledge Management did not lead to a new 
organizational paradigm, but instead mitigated the dysfunctional side-effects of the 
Business Process model and rebalanced the Network paradigm. Compared to the prior 
cycles, however, the Business Process modelǯs innovation and dissemination phases were 
more intertwined, and the dissemination of this model provoked much sooner a 
corresponding paradigm-balancing effort in the form of Knowledge Management. 
The main actors in the development and diffusion of Knowledge Management were 
IT practitioners, IT theorists, IT consultants and HR managers (see Scarbrough and Swan, 
2001). One strand of development involved many of the original actors of the Business 
Process network, leading from innovative Knowledge Management practices developed in 
US companies such as HP by IT specialists such as Sieloff (1999) to IT scholars such as 
Davenport and organization experts such as Prusak (Prusak, 1997; Davenport and Prusak, 
1998; Davenport, Prusak, and Wilson, 2003) who theorized and elaborated these 
innovative practices. A second strand led from innovative practices created in Japanese 
companies such as Honda, Canon and NEC, to the theorization of Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(Takeuchi and Nonaka, 1986; Nonaka 1991, 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995) and in 
particular to Nonaka and Toyamaǯ (2003) concept of ǲBaǡǳ
community of practice (as suggested by Choo and Alvarenga Neto, 2010). Other 
management concepts too might be arrayed under the umbrella of Knowledge 
Management, such the Scrum and agile methods of software development, ǲǳ (Johns and Gratton, 2013) ǲǳȋthe last two further 
below). Thus, we argue, Knowledge Management is more general and pervasive than it 
seems, and perhaps warrants status as a management model. 
Concepts and methodologies related to Knowledge Management were diffused by 
larger IT consultancies (Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Scarbrough, 2002), but also by many 
smaller consulting businesses such as Prusakǯs (1997), by academic institutions 
(Davenport, Prusak, and Wilson, 2003), and by intra- and inter-organizational networks of 
proponents of Knowledge Management (see Scarbrough and Swan, 2001). IT consultancies 
often focused on the IT infrastructure, while the other actors increasingly focused on 
establishing and cultivating the social networks and shared values that supported 
communities of practice (Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder, 2002; Hansen, Nohria, and 
Tierney, 1999).  
Some observers claim that the implementation of Knowledge Management 
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techniques and tools did not live up to the promises made by guru theorists and 
consultancies (Rigby, 2001; Scarbrough, 2002; Spender, 2005). Indeed, many large 
consultancies abandoned Knowledge Management as a product line soon after its boom in 
the second half of the 1990s (Grant, 2011). While major Business Process IT infrastructure 
projects may have yielded disappointingly few benefits for the clients, projects aimed at 
implementing communities of practice yielded even less profit for the larger consultancies. 
Notwithstanding these latter disappointments, proponents have continued advocating 
Knowledge Management and hold out hope for its future development (see Grant, 2011).  
The ICT revolution, however, is not yet exhausted (at least, not as of our writing in 
2017). The bursting of the Internet bubble in 2001 and the financial crash of 2008 revealed 
major institutional misfits that would need to be resolved before ICTs can be deployed 
effectively across wider swaths of industry. Indeed, notwithstanding the apparent ubiquity 
of ICT, there remain vast regions of the economy where its deployment has been as yet 
very limited. ICT has the potential to de-mature, for example, the automobile, transport and 
logistics industries, sparking new developmental trajectories in the leading industries of 
the prior wave. The recent emergence of autonomous vehicles and the more general idea of 
an ǲǳȋǤǤǡAtzori, Iera, and Morabito, 2010; Hui, 2014) underscore the 
massive untapped potential for ICT to revolutionize many more parts of industry and 
everyday life. We have barely begun to see full-scale deployment in healthcare or 
education. 
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, one feature of the current wave of technological 
change is noteworthy: it has brought challenges, first, to the role of gurus with 
oversimplified best-practice theorizations (see studies such as Abrahamson, 1996; Kieser, 
1997, criticizing the faddish quality of many concepts and tools deployed by consultancies), 
and second, to the profit-driven diffusion of these models and tools by large consultancies 
(see critical consultancy studies such as Kipping and Engwall, 2002; Clark and Fincham, 
2002; Kipping and Clark, 2012). Such criticisms have already inspired the exploration of 
alternatives to guru- and consultancy-dominated processes of creating and diffusing 
management models. Some have argued for a new role for scholars (such as in the engaged 
scholarship proposed by Van de Ven and Johnson, 2006; Van de Ven, 2007). Others have 
argued for new forms of action research (such as the Finnish methodology Developmental 
Work Research developed by Engeström, 2005, which uses interventionist research to 
stimulate organizationǯinnovation capacity). And there has been a proliferation of ǲcollaborativeǳ forms of mutual learning among practitioners (Devers, Foster, and Brach, 
2013; Kilo, 1998; Øvretveit et al., 2002; Schouten et al., 2008). The criticism of 
consultancies and the exploration of alternative organizational innovation and change 
mechanisms seem to have further intensified during the early 21st century crisis (e.g., 
Hodgkinson and Starkey, 2011; Alvesson, 2013). 
FROM DESCRIPTION TO EXPLANATION: THREE NESTED, INTERACTING PROCESSES  
 We argue that the evolution of management models sketched in the previous section 
can be theorized as the resultant of the interplay of three nested and interacting processes 
driven by successive waves of technological revolution. We present these key processes in 
the following paragraphs, zooming in from the most macro to the most micro.  
 We understand these processes as relatively autonomous, yet interdependent and 
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interacting. In this characterization, we take inspiration from Freeman and ­ ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
approach to historical analysis and evolutionary theories that allow for both bottom-up 
and top-down selection (a similar approach is adopted by Geels and Schot (2007)).  
Four major waves of paradigm change 
 Our sketch of almost two centuries of management models has given a key role to 
long waves of technological revolution. Each of these waves, we suggested, prompted the 
emergence of new organizational challenges. We are certainly not the first to identify such 
a long-wave pattern in management history; but there is debate over how to interpret it. By 
shifting our focus from the Kondratiev waves of GDP growth that were emphasized in prior 
scholarship to waves of technological revolution, we can see that each of these revolutions 
posed radically new problems in industry, which in turn prompted the emergence of 
radically new organizational paradigms in each wave as part of the ǲǳȋǡ ? ?42: 83).  
In the first period of each of the last four major technological revolutions, new 
technologies emerged and became the basis for the growth of new core industries 
(railroads and steam power, steel and electrical power, automobile and oil, computers and 
telecommunication), and in these industries, organizational and management problems 
were posed acutely enough to prompt substantial and disruptive organizational innovation. 
Each of the four technological revolutions generated a qualitatively new paradigm: from 
Professionally-managed firm, to Factory, to Corporation, to Network. Companies 
emblematic of progress in one paradigmȄsuch as the Erie railroad, Bethlehem steel, 
General Motors Ȅappeared in the subsequent waves ǲǳȋǡ ? ?10).  
Two model-development cycles in each wave 
 Moving down to the next nested level, we observe two model-development cycles in 
each major wave of change. The idea of recurrent, paired cycles of management model 
change is well-established in management history. Barley et al. (Barley and Kunda, 1992; 
Kunda and Ailon-Souday, 2005) advanced the most prominent version, characterized by an 
alternation between rational/technical and normative/human cycles, and this alternation 
was preǲǳǲǳǤ 
We agree with Barley and Kunda that the observed succession of these modelsǯ
emergence presents an alternating focus on technical and human issues; but we are 
missing too much important detail if we see these models only as variants of two basic 
patterns in a cultural dualism. They are better understood, we argue, as poles of a 
dialectical contradiction resulting from primary and secondary model-development cycles: 
the second pole in the pair certainly opposes the first; but it also presupposes it; and the 
two do not simply oscillate as a pendulum but are eventually synthesized before a new 
technological revolution renders that synthesis obsolete. 
Let us recapitulate the sequence of models across the four main waves of 
technological revolutions. The first primary model-development cycle (sparked by the 
steam and railroad revolution) yielded the Line-and-Staff model, and thereby contributed 
to the establishment of a new organizational paradigm which we call the Professionally-
managed firm. But this cycle led also to a degradation of working and living conditions for 
workers. This degradation provoked conflicts, which in turn led to a secondary cycle that 
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gave rise to the Industrial Betterment model. Industrial Betterment did not undo the Line-
and-Staff model, but added a counter-balancing social function in the form of welfare 
secretaries.  
The second primary cycle (sparked by the steel and electricity revolution) yielded 
the Scientific Management model, and thereby contributed to the establishment of a new 
organizational paradigm that we call the Factory. But it led also to high turnover and low 
morale of workers due to close control over how and how fast tasks were performed. These 
problems provoked a secondary cycle that yielded the Human Relations model. This 
Human Relations model certainly built on some of the ideas of the Industrial Betterment 
model; but it also introduced a new array of management concepts to deal with the 
distinctive features of the problems thrown up by Scientific Management. As we showed 
with our discussion of TWI, Human Relations did not undo Scientific Management but 
rebalanced the Factory paradigm.  
The third primary cycle (sparked by the automobile and oil revolution) yielded the 
Strategy-and-Structure model, and thereby contributed to the establishment of an 
organizational paradigm that we call the Corporation. But it led to poor quality and service, 
low worker involvement, lack of cooperation and political games among managers. These 
problems provoked a secondary cycle aimed at quality, organization culture, and 
organization learning. The resulting Quality Management model did not undo the Strategy-
and-Structure model but remedied its dysfunctions and stabilized the Corporation 
paradigm. Here too, while Quality Management inherited some ideas from Human 
Relations and Industrial Betterment models, it introduced in turn an array of novel 
concepts that were motivated by the distinctive problems arising from the Strategy-and-
Structure model and that therefore focused on the team and its responsibility for 
improving quality. 
Our analysis of the most recent wave was more tentative, but we suggested that the 
fourth primary cycle (sparked by the computer and telecommunication revolution) yielded 
the Business Process model and thus contributed to the establishment of a new 
organizational paradigm that we call the Network. Here ICT was deployed to outsource all 
non-core activities and to rationalize the management of both internal and supply-chain 
processes. But this cycle led to the neglect of human involvement and weakened the 
innovation-generating capacity of firms. These problems in turn appear to have provoked a 
secondary cycle that led to the emergence of Knowledge Management. And here again, 
while there is some continuity of Knowledge Management with prior paradigm-balancing 
models, we see conceptual innovation around the idea of community of practice.  
Generalizing across these four waves, we see that the primary cycles focused on 
developing a model that facilitated the exploitation of the new possibilities generated by 
the new technologiesȄovercoming the limitations in this new technological context of the 
paradigm inherited from the prior revolution, and leading to the emergence of a new 
organizational paradigm. By contrast, the secondary cycles responded to the unanticipated 
problems created by the limitations of this primary-cycle model, and aimed to rebalance 
the new paradigm. Our historical account offered some evidence for this interpretation: 
Table 3 offers some further textual evidence for it. Here we see in the words of proponents 
of each of the second-cycle models explicit reference to this rebalancing goal. 
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------- Table 3: Secondary cycles and their motivating problems ---- 
We see these paired models as reflecting a contradiction (where the second 
simultaneously opposes and presupposes the first) rather than a cultural antinomy. Viewed 
this way, we can recognize that beneath the appearance of alternation we find that the two 
models eventually give way to a dialectical synthesis. Industrial ǯ
secretaries evolved into personnel managersȄspecialized staff managers who were 
integrated into and enhanced the effectiveness of the Line-and-Staff model in 
professionally-managed firms. Although Human Relations proponents often portrayed 
their efforts as opposing Scientific Management, in reality the two models were often used 
in conjunction, and under TWI they were explicitly synthesized. Similarly, quality, culture 
and learning approaches were often portrayed as opposed to the mechanistic bureaucracy 
of Strategy-and-Structure; but in practice these normative and rational approaches were 
typically combined (see for example Bate, Khan, and Pye, 2000; Beer and Nohria, 2000). 
More recently, theorists such as Davenport have sought a synthesis of the Business Process 
model and Knowledge Management (Davenport, 2010).  
Four problem-solving phases in each cycle 
 To avoid an excessively mechanical account of this evolutionary process, we need to 
zoom in yet one more step, to account for the actors that lead to the birth of new 
management models and their diffusion. As is visible in the historical sketch offered in the 
previous section, this process unfolds in four interrelated, overlapping, and non-linear 
phases: (1) various efforts to articulate a widespread organizational and management 
problem, (2) competing management concepts offer innovative solutions, (3) a 
management model emerges from among these concepts as a theorized solution, and (4) 
the management model is diffused.12 Each phase is typically dominated by different actors, 
and the different pressures and opportunities facing these actors influence the diffusion 
successes and failures of any given management model.  
 These four phases and their constituent moments are often discussed separately in 
the management literature. Many studies focus on problem articulation (e.g., Cowan, 1986, 
1990; Landry, 1995; von Hippel and Tyre, 1996), or management innovation (e.g., 
Damanpour, 1991; Van de Ven, 1999), on theorizing management concepts (the literature 
on management fashions, e.g., Abrahamson, 1996; Kieser, 1997; Suddaby and Greenwood, 
2001, 2005) or diffusing management concepts (the literature on consultancies, e.g., 
Kipping and Engwall, 2002; Clark and Fincham, 2002; Kipping and Clark, 2012); but our 
understanding is deepened if we see their interconnection. Birkinshaw, Hamel and Mol 
(2008) show the way, in an account that addresses the first three phases. 
 The cycle characterized by these four phases parallels, as Barley and Kunda (1992) 
demonstrated, the evolution of successful social movements (e.g., Blumer, 1969; Macionis, 
2012); we argue here that it also parallels the trajectory followed by individual 
technological innovations (e.g., Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Dosi, 1982; Nelson and 
                                                        
12  While both sequences might be represented as S-shaped logistic curves, the four phases are 
different from the four periods of a technological revolution: the former are notional, and in 
reality are interrelated, overlapping, and non-linear; the latter are distinct historical periods in 
the trajectory of a given cluster of technologies. 
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Winter, 1982; Freeman and Louçã, 2001; Perez, 2002; Murmann and Frenken, 2006). A 
technological trajectory starts with a technological discontinuity and the identification of ǲreverse salientsǳȄthe parts of the emergent new system that lag the advancing 
performance frontier and hamper its progress (Hughes, 1993). Various actors address 
these reverse salients through experimentation (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978, Perez, 
2010). Eventuallǡǡǲdominant ǳ(Utterback and Abernathy, 1975, Utterback and Suarez, 1993Ȍǡǲǳȋǡ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡǲǳȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǤominant design 
functions like a technology standard: technological innovation can now focus on improving 
the processes for implementing that design (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). This opens 
the diffusion and adaptation phase, when process innovation efforts comes to the fore 
(Nelson and Winter, 1977) along with incremental product innovations compatible with 
the dominant design (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975). The diffusion process is further 
accelerated by mechanisms such as bandwagon effects and network externalities (Arthur, 
1988).  
Let us explicate the phases of managerial innovation in light of what this literature 
has taught us about the phases of technological innovation. In the first phase, innovators 
articulate a widespread organizational and management problemȄan organizational 
reverse salient. For the primary-cycle, paradigm-revolutionizing models, this reverse 
salient was the inadequacy of prevailing models of management relative to the 
potentialities of the new technologies. One indicator of such a reverse salient are ǲproductivity paradoxesǳ such as the one observed in the 1980s (Solow, 1987; for a 
discussion of similar paradoxes during prior waves see David, 1990). For the secondary-
cycle, paradigm-balancing models, the reverse salient was the disruption caused by the 
inadequacy of the primary-ǯ. In the primary cycles, the salient was 
encountered first by actors in the new core industries: examples include McCollum at the 
Erie Railroad, Taylor at Midvale Steel, Sloan at General Motors, Sieloff at HP. In the 
secondary cycles, the salients were felt more diffusely. 
The second phase of this cycleȄcreating innovative solutions to this organizational 
and managerial problemȄtypically involved considerable trial and error experimentation, 
in ǲǳȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǲǳȋÚǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ, as in the cases 
of Taylor, Mayo/Roethlisberger or Ohno. Multiple management concepts emerge in this 
phase, competing with and complementing each other. 
In the third phase, a new model emerges from among the promising concepts and 
offers a theorized solution. This theorization facilitates diffusion to other companies and 
other industries. The challenge here is to find what Dayvdov (1990) characterize as a ǲǳȄthe simplest conceptualization of a phenomenon that 
captures all its relevant elements and relationships and that provides the methodological 
means for relating different variants of the phenomenon to each other (thereby enabling 
the applicability of the conceptualization in different contexts). Winter and Szulanski 
(2001) characterize this challenge as identifǲǳȄǲǡǳȋ ? ? ? ǣ ? ? ?ȌǤ This process was advanced by 
theorists (Taylor; Mayo/ Roethlisberger; Drucker; Deming/ Ishikawa/ Juran; Hammer/ 
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Davenport; Nonaka/ Takeushi) who were typically connected to companies in which the 
innovations were developed, and who were knowledgeable about the respective new 
technologies or the social problems following the implementation of these technologies.  ǡǯ
articles and books and sold as products by consulting companies. Over the past century, 
boutique consulting by such theorist-gurus was increasingly overtaken by larger 
consultancies (Bedaux, McKinsey, CSC/Accenture etc.) and public-sector organizations ȋǡȌǤǯmodels to maximize ǲ-ǳion of solutions in a large number of client 
companies.  
The case of the Business Process model and its initially dominant concept BPR 
illustrates how solutions that were used as best-practice exemplars by consultancies 
deviated from the solutions conceptualized by theorists, and how the latter in turn deviated 
from the solutions created by the innovators. Not surprisingly, the effectiveness of ǯhas been much debated. We see 
much the same critical comments and debates concerning Scientific Management 
consultancies (Kreis, 1992), Strategy-and-Structure consultancies (Ernst and Kieser, 2002) 
and Business Process consultancies (Davenport, 1995; Fincham, 1995).13 
A multi-layered evolution 
 We understand the interaction of these three processesȄwaves, cycles, phasesȄto 
operate along the lines suggested by Giddens (1984) in his characterization of the mutual 
constitution of structure and action (see also Barley and Tolbert, 1997). When actors are 
confronted with a technological revolution (which we treat here as largely exogenous) that 
radically transforms the structure of technological constraints and affordances, they are 
thereby also confronted with the inadequacy of existing management paradigms, models, 
and concepts inherited from the prior period. The resulting structural tensions prompt 
actors to create, theorize, and spread organizational innovations that contributeȄvia the ǲǳ from micro agency to macro structureȄto the resolution of these tensions 
by the formation of new management concepts. Through trial and error, some of these 
concepts eventually cohere as a robust new management model, and such models first 
revolutionize and then rebalance a new organizational paradigm that fits the new 
technological conditions. (In parallel with this process, other actors, working in other 
spheres of activity, are developing ideas and artifacts that will eventually manifest 
themselves as a new technological revolution.) Figure 1 suggests a visualization of this 
process. 
------- Put Figure 1 here---- 
 Once a paradigm, model, or concept achieves a dominant position, it functions as a 
new ǲstructureǳȋ
ǯ (1984) sense), exercising ǲdownward pressureǳ, which shapes 
                                                        
13 We note that this contestation has been more intense for primary-cycle paradigm-revolutionizing 
models than for secondary-cycle paradigm-balancing models. These latter were dominated by 
other types of actors, such as governmental agencies, research systems, institutes, user 
networks: these actors are less profit-driven, which may obviate some of the problems 
experienced in consultancy-driven diffusion. 
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subsequent action by creating a taken-for-granted frame of reference, associated routines 
and artifacts, as well as new interests in sustaining the new status-quo. Paradigms, models, 
and concepts are thus all structures ǲstretching across time-ǳȋ
ǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?Ȍ; 
but they vary in their generality, pervasiveness, and therefore in their durability: 
paradigms are more durable than models, and models more durable than concepts. As a 
result, management innovation progressesȄvia the mutual constitution of agency and 
structureȄfrom concepts to models to paradigms, challenging and eventually changing 
those structures.  
DISCUSSION 
 We have argued that the evolution of management models can be understood as the 
resultant of the interplay of three interacting processes. Here we explore whether this 
account helps us make sense of the emerging new management concepts, and whether, 
looking back over the past century and half, it helps us make sense of the longer-term 
evolution of management models 
Emerging new concepts 
 As we noted above, the present is always difficult to see in historical perspective. 
This risk cannot be completely avoided, but we can manage it better if we are armed with a 
more robust theory of the forces shaping change. Our theory suggests that in aiming to 
interpret any given management innovation, we should ask: Is it responding to a 
technological revolution? Is it associated with a specific paradigm? Is it associated with a 
specific management model? But our theory also suggests that there is no quick way to 
arrive at a convincing answer to such questions: we need to parse carefully the four phases 
of the management ǯ development; examine the problems and opportunities 
that motivated an innovation's originators; identify where in the industrial landscape those 
problems and opportunities arose most forcefully, and where the emerging solutions found 
most enthusiastic reception. We need further to explore the similarities and differences 
with other concepts and models already on offer. It is only through such a multi-
dimensional study that any given innovation can be characterized with much confidence. 
Not surprisingly, the study of present day innovations-in-progress is particularly difficult, 
clouded as our understanding must be by the lack of historical perspective. 
 With that huge caveat, let us see what light we can shed, first, on the concept of ǲopen innovationǤǳ As we read the available research, it seems that the downsizing, 
outsourcing, and focus on core competences associated with Business Process initiatives of 
the 1990s had the unintended side effect of potentially limiting a companǯǯ innovation-
generating capacities to those available within. To overcome this limitation required a 
broader view of the communities of practice that could contribute to innovation generation 
(Fjeldstad et al., 2012). The success of open source (e.g., Linux or Apache) served as 
inspiration for companies in the ICT industries to adopt a new approachȄopen innovation 
(Chesbrough, 2003a, 2003b; Gassmann, 2006; Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007). In 
contrast with prevailing "closed innovation" strategy, open innovation aimed to develop 
systems for linking internal and external communities of knowledge workers in inbound 
and outbound innovation activities (Huizingh, 2011). New ICTs facilitated communication 
and collaboration across these boundaries (Dodgson, Gann and Salter, 2006; Huizingh, 
2011). The publicity given to these exemplary cases further contributed to the diffusion of 
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open innovation (Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006). The concept of open innovation began 
to diffuse beyond high-technology industries where innovation was the primary driver of 
competitiveness, to industries such as in machinery, medical equipment, consumer goods, 
food, architecture, and logistics (Gassman, Enkel, and Chesbrough, 2010).  
 This reading suggests that we might see Open Innovation not so much as part of the 
primary, Business Process cycle, but as a management concept that belongs under the 
secondary, Knowledge Management cycle. Yes, Open Innovation encourages the dispersion 
of activity across organizations and embraces the Network paradigm; but its proponents 
are acutely aware that social ties of a community-of-practice type are critical to 
organizational effectiveness in that new paradigm. 
Second, consider the concept of ǲcoworking spaces.ǳ Here it is even clearer that the 
organizational and management problem that prompted the emergence of coworking 
spaces was created by the downsizing and outsourcing associated with Business Process 
initiatives. The result was that many knowledge workers found themselves as independent 
contractors and freelancers. Early Knowledge Management concepts addressed 
dysfunctions related to the Business Process model by establishing communities of practice 
inside and across companies; but this left many independent knowledge workers and 
freelancers outside companies without adequate communities to support their practice.  
The innovative solution developed by the independent IT specialist Brad Neuberg in 
San Francisco was to offer the spatial and social infrastructure for a community of practice 
relevant to people like himselfȄto freelancers, entrepreneurs and other individual 
knowledge workers (Neuberg, n.d.; Hunt, 2009).14 The theorization phase of coworking 
evolved rather differently from the theorization of prior concepts. Brad Neuberg (n.d.: para. 
8), member of the open-source movement, suggested to his colleagues and friends to ǲ
this idea, steal it, and make it your own.ǳ Two of Neuberg's colleagues, the social media 
consultants Chris Messina and Tara Hunt, were instrumental in conceptualizing the 
coworking idea by developing a coworking wiki and a Google groups list. The coworking 
concept diffused first within the San Francisco area, later within the US and then 
worldwide (Neuberg, n.d.; Hunt, 2009). Here, the means of diffusion were the coworking 
wiki, the online magazine Deskmag.com, national and continental ǲGlobal Coworking 
Unconference Conferencesǳ (GCUC), and an increasing number of texts and books on 
coworking (Deskmag, n.d.).  
This brief discussion suggests that we might see coworking, like Open Innovation, as 
a concept contributing to the creation of new types of communities of practice, and falling 
under the Knowledge Management model and the Network paradigm.  
A longer-term trend?  
 In contrast to the image of a pendulum swinging, we have argued that the evolution 
of management models needs to be understood as part of a series of technological and 
organizational paradigm revolutions. Readers might therefore legitimately ask if our image 
of successive revolutions affords any greater insight into the longer-term direction of 
change across these revolutions. 
                                                        
14 A similar development took place within the "Hub" in London (Deskmag, n.d.), where the initial 
focus was on social entrepreneurs. 
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 Reviewing the evolution of both primary and secondary cycles across these waves 
suggests that they have both evolved towards an ever-ǲǳ
design and change process. The first of the primary cycles yielded a model that rationalized 
the role of the professional manager. The primary cycles of subsequent waves 
progressively widened the scope from the manager to workstations and factories, to 
corporations, and finally to processes that spanned interfirm boundaries. Likewise, the 
object of secondary cycles broadened over the successive paradigms from individual 
managers and workers, to teams, and then to communities of practice.  
This widening scope implies not only quantitative expansion but also qualitatively 
greater ǲcomplexityǳȄheterogeneous activities, interlinked in a greater variety of ways, 
spanning entities under different ownership and control. The optimization of 
heterogeneous work processes synchronized in the factory represented a task of greater 
complexity than the professionalization of management in the railroads. The 
reorganization of the multi-divisional corporation aimed at mastering a more complex task 
than the optimization of the single factory. And the redesign of supply-chains across firms 
is a more complex task again than the reorganization of the individual corporation.  
Moreover, reviewing our account of the actors involved in the various phases 
associated with successive waves and cycles, we also note a related, long-term trend. While 
management history has focused to date on consultancies as the key actors in the 
dissemination of new models of management (e.g., Clark and Fincham, 2002; Kipping and 
Engwall, 2002; Kipping and Clark, 2012), our historical sketch suggests that the community 
of actors involved has evolved towards a more complex and interdependent division of 
labor, one that now includes industrial innovators, theorists-gurus, government agencies, 
and industry peer networks. The interdependence among these actors with respect to 
model development and diffusion has grown over time and the boundaries between them 
have blurred.  
This combination of growing complexity of the division of labor, growing 
interdependence among actors, and increasing scope of the corresponding integration and 
control efforts might plausible be read as indicators of what Adler (2012) calls the ǲsocialization of production.ǳ ǡǡǲǳǲǳ dimensionȄthat is, it operates at both societal and individual levels. 
Objectively, it consists in giving any one enterprise access to a wider range of capabilities 
through a wider array of denser ties to other enterprises and other sources of expertiseȄ
which we have just described. The subjective component corresponds to the more familiar 
use of the word: the process of acquiring this wider range of capabilities by the focal actor. 
Consider this thought experiment: a manager working in the early 19th century time-
travels into the present, and is asked to work as a manager in a contemporary company: he 
or she would first need to master many of the lessons accumulated by the successive 
paradigms and models of the last century and a half. Developmental psychologists such as 
Vygotsky (1978) explain the mechanism that connects societal and individual 
development: The child masters the skills (speaking, writing, calculating, etc.) and cultural 
resources that their society has accumulated over the course of its history. Ontogeny does ǲǳ (Gould, 1977), but the socialization of the individual involves 
the internalization of the collective, accumulated assets of a historically formed culture. 
(Later in their lives, in turn, some individuals develop innovations contributing new assets 
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to that evolving culture.) We see a related process in management. Each of the models that 
has left its mark on the overall evolution of management offers a lesson for the individual 
who wants to master management as an activity.  
We can summarize the lessons succinctly. Line-and-Staff: do not attempt to do 
everything aloneȄlearn how to use professional assistance. Industrial Betterment: focus 
some of this professional assistance on the social aspects of the operation. Scientific 
Management: define ǯ and optimize how they are executed. Human 
Relations: attend to the motivation of the employees executing these tasks. Strategy-and-
Structure: ensure your ǯ
markets. Quality Management: organizational structure is not worth much if employees ǯ quality of their products and services. 
Business Process: stay attuned the processes that span internal and external boundaries 
and the profitable opportunities provided by new technology to change those boundaries 
and the links across them. Knowledge Management: cultivate the communities of practice 
needed to sustain innovation in these dispersed value-chain activities.  
We see these lessons as reflecting a (disruptable, reversible, open-ended) long-term 
trend of accumulation of management-related cultural assets across waves, cycles and 
phases. This trend is almost imperceptible in everyday life because lessons originating in 
prior revolutions are viewed as ǲcommon sense,ǳ while the challenges of the present 
technological revolution are far more salient in current experience and discussions. Figure 
2 visualizes this longer-term perspective on our argument. 
---Figure 2: The evolution of models over long period---- 
Our theory highlights the interplay of repetitive patterns and progressive patterns, 
an open-ended dialectical evolution, sparked periodically by technological revolutions. The ǲǫǳȋ
ǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?Ȍult to 
answer. 
CONCLUSION 
Our theory of the evolution of management models differentiates three nested and 
interacting processes (four main waves, two cycles, four phases) driven by successive 
technological revolutions. We argued that this evolution represents the emergent result of 
bottom-up innovation and top-down selection driven by the tension between the 
possibilities opened up by technological revolution and the constraints created by 
established organizational paradigms and practices. Our theory thus ǲǳǲǳn change. Actors involved in creating, theorizing and diffusing 
organizational innovations play an important role in shaping management models and 
concepts, and thereby shaping organizational paradigms. Yet, once a management model or 
an organizational paradigm achieved a dominant position, it was ǲǳ
and shaped human decision-making. 
We have built on the neo-Schumpeterian work of Perez and others on technological 
revolutions, and we extended this work with a focus on the organization and management 
dimension of these revolutions. This line of argument suggests several issues and 
Management models p.  
 
36 
opportunities for future research. 
First, while our analysis focused on some of the key models of organization 
highlighted by prior research, future research might usefully deploy our frameworks to 
explore the larger population of innovative management concepts (Birkinshaw, Hamel, and 
Mol, 2008; Mol and Birkinshaw, 2014; Volberda, Bosch, and Mihalache, 2014) in order to ǲǳǤThe logic of our 
argument implies, for example, that a given management model is likely to inspire the 
creation of incremental innovation in the form of management concepts that are more 
tailored to specific applications: it would therefore be useful to draw more detailed 
genealogical charts. Our effort to group management concepts into higher-order models 
and to link the models to specific paradigms should be tested by more rigorous statistical 
analysis on a richer corpus of text.  
A second set of issues flows from the limited attention we have paid to changes in 
institutional context. Some of these changesȄmost notably, warsȄhave had major effects 
on the evolution we address. The American Civil War (e.g., Clark, 2001), World War One 
(e.g., Bruce, 1995), and World War Two (e.g., Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings, 1986) all 
influenced the evolution of both technology and management models. Such historical 
contingencies are difficult to integrate into any general and simple historical theory such as 
we have tried to develop here. Other institutional changes, however, are less purely 
exogenous, and future research might useful attempt to integrate our insights with the 
literature on socio-economic regulation (e.g., Boyer, 1990) and social structures of 
accumulation (e.g., Gordon, Edwards, and Reich, 1982). Those two strands of scholarship 
bring into the foreground macro-contextual institutional changes that we addressed only 
marginally. 
A third set of issues concerns the influence on the evolution of technology and 
management models attributable to the autonomous activity of actors in this field, such as 
engineers, consultants, gurus, or business schools. Such activity might help explain the 
emergence and exhaustion of these paradigms and models. Our simplifying assumption has 
been that these ǯsubordinate to the opportunities and 
constraints created by technological revolutions. We acknowledge that this argument 
represents a strong claim that calls for theoretical nuancing and empirical testing. 
Fourth, there are interesting issues to be explored at the firm level. Our paper 
followed Barley and Kunda (1992) in focusing the emergence of new concepts, models, and 
paradigms. But these persist over time, albeit under labels that might change, so at any 
given time, managers confront a range of ideas ǲes,ǳ and all of them, we 
noted in the previous section, have some bearing on the practice of management. Our 
Schumpeterian accounts implies that managers will pay more attention to those that fit 
their technological opportunities and constraints; but these vary across industry and 
indeed across firms within a given industry. How managers make sense of all this is an 
important question for future research. Jacobides, MacDuffie and Tae (2016) offer an 
exemplary case study along these lines. 
A further limitation of our theory is that it is predominantly informed by the 
evolution of management models in just one country, the USA. Future research should 
assess how our theory needs to be expanded or modified if the focus broadens to include 
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other countries. Such research can build on 
±ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍwork to explore differences in 
the development and adoption of management models in a broader international context. 
Where Guillén focused on the UK, Germany or Spain, today it is urgent to broaden our field 
of vision to other countries such as China, India, Brazil, Russia, Japan.  
Finally, our study suggests we need a stronger integration of management and 
organization studies with technology studies. Our field often treats technology at a level of ǯand ǯtasks are transformed by new technologies. Without a concrete enough 
understand of tasks and technologies, however, it is difficult to understand some of the 
more powerful forces that shape organizations and drive change in management models. 
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Figure 1: Primary and secondary cycles 
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Figure 2: Revolutions, paradigms, and models over a long period (a simplified 
representation)  
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Table 1: Timeline of technological revolutions (adapting Perez, 2002) 
 
 
Technological revolution Examples of dominant US companies (and 
year founded) 
1st wave: Water power and iron  
Incubation: 1750s-1770 
Installation: 1771-1793 
Crisis/turning point: 1793-1797 
Deployment: 1797-1829 
Exhaustion: 1830-1840s 
 
2nd wave: Steam power and railways 
Incubation: 1790s-1829s 
Installation: 1829-1848 
Crisis/turning point: 1848-1850 
Deployment: 1850-1873 
Exhaustion: 1873-1890s 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad (1827) 
Erie Railroad (1832) 
Pennsylvania Railroad (1846) 
3rd wave: Steel and electric power  
Incubation: 1850s-1875 
Installation: 1875-1893 
Crisis/turning point: 1893-1895  
Deployment: 1895-1918 
Exhaustion: 1918-1940s 
Bethlehem Steel (1857) 
Midvale Steel (1867) 
Carnegie Steel (1872) (part of U.S. Steel as of 
1901)  
4th wave: Automobile and oil 
Incubation: 1880s-1908 
Installation: 1908-1929 
Crisis/turning point: 1929-44 
Deployment: 1944-1974 
Exhaustion: 1974-1980s 
Ford (1903) 
General Motors (1908) 
Chrysler (1925) (predecessor Maxwell founded 
1904)  
5th wave: Computers and telecommunication 
Incubation: 1950s-1971  
Installation: 1971-2001 
Crisis/turning point: 2000/2008 
Deployment: ? 
Exhaustion: ? 
IBM (1911)  
Hewlett Packard (1939) 
Microsoft (1975) 
Apple (1976) 
Google (1998) 
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Table 2: Technological revolutions, models, concepts 
 
 
Technology 
revolution 
Organizational 
paradigm  
Dominant management model and key elements Management concepts Emergence1 
Steam power 
and railways 
Professionally-
managed firm: 
The rationalized 
management of 
geographically 
dispersed 
enterprise 
 
 
Revolutionizing cycle: Line and Staff 
The establishment of specialized line and staff 
managers, unrelated to the owner, who would 
responsibly administer a large, complex firm 
Staff and line 1861 
Line and staff 1869 
Organization chart 1889 
Balancing cycle: Industrial Betterment 
The addition of a social function among the staff ǯliving and 
working conditions 
Employee benefit* 1895 
Industrial betterment 1899 
Welfare work 1906 
Welfare secretar* 1913 
Steel and electric 
power  
Factory: 
The unitary, 
centralized 
organization 
structure 
Revolutionizing cycle: Scientific Management 
Time and motion study, incentive wages, and 
workflow analysis as ways to optimize and 
accelerate production in a facility 
Scientific Management 1896 
Taylorism 1900 
Standardization of methods 1914 
Balancing cycle: Human Relations 
Making line managers and staff specialists 
responsible for responding to the alienation 
induced by rationalized workstation operations 
Human relations 1929 
Group dynamics 1945 
Personnel counseling 1945 
Automobile and 
oil  
Corporation:  
The multi-
divisional mass-
production 
corporation with 
strategic 
integration but 
operating 
autonomy in the 
Revolutionizing cycle: Strategy-and-Structure 
Differentiating internal structure and strategy so as 
to support the production, marketing and sales of 
differentiated products to different types of 
costumers 
Profit center* 1955 
Operations research 1956 
Corporate Strateg* 1965 
Multidivisional  1965 
Matrix structure* 1969 
Divisionalization 1971 
Management by objective 1972 
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divisions 
 
Balancing cycle: Quality Management 
Deploying a management system to involve 
personnel at all levels in continuously improving 
product and process quality 
Job enrichment 1972 
Quality circle* 1979 
Corporate culture* 1980 
Organizational learning 1981 
Total quality management  1986 
Continuous improvement 1988 
Lean production 1992 
Computers and 
telecommunicati
on 
Network:  
Linking and 
rationalizing 
processes across 
internal and 
external 
boundaries 
Revolutionizing cycle: Business Process 
The redesign of business processes up and down 
the value chain, redrawing and bridging internal 
and external boundaries 
Business process redesign 1991 
Outsourcing 1991 
Horizontal organization* 1991 
Process improvement 1991 
Business process 
reengineering 
1992 
Core competencies 1993 
Business model* 1994 
Inter-firm network* 1995 
Supply-chain management 1996 
Balancing cycle: Knowledge Management 
The cultivation of communities of practice in order 
to regain, retain or improve the innovation capacity 
of dispersed employees 
Knowledge management 1996 
Intellectual capital 1997 
Knowledge repositor* 1998 
Communities of practice 1998 
Agile 2 1998 
Scrum 2  2005  
1  Emergence ǯǡȀ	ǡǯǡǡǡpers 
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collection. 
2  ȋǲȀ ?ǳȌ 
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Table 3: Secondary cycles and their motivating problems 
 
Primary, 
paradigm -
revolutionizing 
model 
Key 
dysfunctions of 
primary model 
Secondary, 
paradigm- 
balancing 
modelǯ
solution to the 
dysfunctions 
Supporting text 
Line-and Staff Growing gap 
between the 
management 
and the worker, 
arduous living 
and working 
conditions, 
strikes 
Industrial 
Betterment: 
Establish 
welfare 
secretary (or 
social secretary) 
to addresses 
grievances of 
workers and 
prevent strikes  
"In the old times master and man lived and worked together; there was a 
daily point of contact, a continuous personal touch. Today all is changed (...) 
the personal touch, the point of contact has been lost. (...) However, our 
American industrialists are beginning to realize that an intelligent regard and 
a tactful care for the labor part of the business is not only right, but a large 
factor in industrial peace and contentment (...) The problem which confronts 
the social secretary is how to improve the conditions of life and labor for the 
individual, not only in the factory and workshop where he spends the greater 
part of his working day but in his home and all other relations in which he 
meets his fellowmen." (Tolman, 1909: 48-50) 
Scientific 
Management 
High turnover 
and low morale 
of workers due 
to management 
control over 
how and how 
fast tasks were 
performed 
Human 
Relations: 
Influence 
individual ǯ
attitudes in 
order to (re-) 
create greater 
harmony and 
sense of 
community 
within the 
company 
"(...) pessimistic reveries, which culminate in disorder and unrest 
(absenteeism, high labor turnover, strikes) are relatively easily controlled 
provided that the management has a means of discovering  the nature of its 
cause (...) The investigation of individual situations is more satisfactory than 
the inquiry into general or departmental situation (...) In by far the greater 
number of cases there is some unsatisfactory circumstance, usually of 
personal history or private life, which is a habitual topic of dispersed thinking 
or revery. Any monotony of occupation or unpleasantness in work tends to 
extend and emphasize this thinking (...) whenever pessimistic reflection 
emerges, the effect on productive efficiency is striking and immediate. (...) In a 
sense, this work involves an extension of that begun by the pioneer, whose 
name is honored by this society. Taylor confined his attention, upon the 
whole, to the irrelevant synthesis or mistaken coordination in our muscular 
apparatus. There is an urgent need to extend this inquiry to discover what 
irrelevant syntheses of emotions and ideas are imposed upon workers." 
(Mayo, 1924: 255-259) 
Strategy-and-
Structure 
Poor quality and 
service, low 
worker 
Quality 
Management: 
Train and 
ǲThe evidence is overwhelming that in the case of the color TV set, the 
Japanese do a more complete scrub down than do their competitors in the ǤȋǥȌǡ less complete and the manufacturers 
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involvement, 
lack of 
cooperation and 
political 
gamesmanship  
involve teams in 
order to assure 
higher quality  
are usually aware that the quality problems have not been fully solved. 
However, the decision is nearly always to go to market anyway because of the 
pressures of the schedule. (...) Manufacture is done by a few large companies. 
Marketing is done mainly by numerous independent distributors and 
retailers. Repair service is done mainly by numerous independent repair 
shops. In Japan, as in the West, manufacture is also done by a few large 
companies. However, marketing is done mainly by captive markets controlled 
by these same manufacturers. In addition, service shop networks are owned 
by the large manufacturers.ǳ (Juran, 1978: 11-13) 
Business 
Process 
Risks to the 
fabric of 
collective tacit 
knowledge 
among 
experienced 
employees and 
to the 
innovation-
generating 
capacity of the 
firm 
Knowledge 
Management: 
Strengthen and 
deploy the 
knowledge-
producing 
capacity of 
communities of 
practice 
ǲOf course, the real creators of reengineering weren't consultants or 
academics. They were real people with real problems to fix (...) experimenting 
with new uses of information technology to link processes that cut across 
functional boundaries (...) The rock that reengineering has foundered on is 
simple: people. Reengineering treated the people inside companies as if they 
were just so many bits and bytes, interchangable parts to be reengineered. 
But no one wants to "be reengineered." No one wants to hear dictums like, ǮCarry the wounded but shoot the stragglersǯ - language that makes workers 
feel like prisoners of war (...) putting the company's veterans through their 
paces like they're just another group of idiots who Ǯcan't think out of the box.ǯǳ 
(Davenport, 1995: 70-71) 
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